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RECOGNITION OF AN UNFAIR
BURDEN
by Christopher D. Atwell
I. INTRODUCTIONEVER since Gideon v. Wainright1 and its progeny2 dramatically ex-
panded the indigent defendant's constitutional right to counsel, the
courts and the legal profession have directed a renewed focus to-
wards the extent of this right. Although opinions differ, 3 the attention the
controversy has elicited4 has produced little concrete action for providing
the indigent with legal services. 5 State bars, for example, continue to con-
1. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942), and
applying sixth amendment guarantee of counsel to states in felony proceedings). See also
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (both
cases precursors to holding in Gideon ).
2. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (determination of indigent defendant's
right to counsel at parole revocation hearing made on case by case basis); Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (defendant to misdemeanor charges which resulted in imprison-
ment entitled to counsel); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (indigent criminal
defendant's right to counsel at preliminary hearing); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967)
(felony defendant's right to counsel at post-trial proceeding revoking probation and imposing
deferred sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (defendant entitled to
counsel at postindictment lineup); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (juvenile's right to coun-
sel in proceeding which may lead to incarceration); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469
(1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966) (indigent's right to counsel at custodial
interrogation).
3. See Swygert, Should Indigent Civil Litigants in the Federal Courts Have a Right to
Appointed Counsel, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1267, 1301 (1982) (contending indigent civil
plaintiffs deserve counsel in some cases); Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to the
Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 651, 688-89 (1981) (proposing funding to satisfy all of the poor's
legal needs); Botein, Appointed Counsel for the Indigent Civil Defendant A Constitutional
Right Without a Judicial Remedy?, 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 368, 373-74, 377 (1970) (arguing
all indigent civil defendents deserve representation).
4. See infra notes 145-152 and accompanying text (examining availability of legal serv-
ices to indigent civil litigant).
5. See Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735, 738
(1980) [hereinafter Shapiro] ("for the moment at least, the drive for a nationwide system of
mandatory service, backed by disciplinary sanctions has abated, though the controversy is
likely to continue at both the national and local levels"); Note, Why Mandatory Pro Bono Is a
Bad Idea, 3 GEo J.L. ETHics 623, 632-38 (1990) (noting same failure of bar associations to
adopt mandatory pro bono requirements since 1980). See also Bars Grapple with Ways to Raise
Legal Assistance, B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1988 at 27, 28. By early 1988 only six local bars,
notably Greenwich, Conn. and El Paso, Tx., required mandatory pro bono service from their
members. No state bar association has adopted such a requirement, however, despite many
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duct so-called "harmless" studies on the need for legal services rather than
implementing requirements of public service for their members.6
Much of the recent debate focuses on the indigent civil litigant's right to
counsel7 but this debate over the indigent's rights in a variety of proceedings,
has largely ignored the rights of the counsel asked to provide free representa-
tion.8 Although some scholarship has been specifically directed to an attor-
ney's rights when asked to represent an indigent client,9 much of this
analysis is dated due to recent developments in both the organized bar and
the courts.10 Many courts now are unwilling to compel a lawyer to serve,
state studies conducted on such a need. Id. See generally Twenty Hour Requirement Urged by
New York Commission, PBI BULL. BOARD, Aug. 1989, at 1 (noting no state has adopted
mandatory pro bono publico requirement although four states are now considering one); Sha-
piro, supra at 735-39 (movement on mandatory pro bono issue stalled at ABA and New York
City bar levels); Valparaiso Law Students Face Mandatory Requirement, PBI BULL. BOARD,
Sept. 1989, at 1 (Valapraiso now fourth school to adopt pro bono requirement for students).
6. See Boards Adopt Voluntary Pro Bono Standards, PBI BULL. BOARD, Sept. 1989, at 3
(noting Wisconsin and West Virginia state bars, acting on recommendations from long-stand-
ing committees, recently refused to go farther than requesting and exhorting members to do-
nate time); Note, supra note 5, at 632-38 (examining failure of three state bars and legislatures
to pass mandatory pro bono measures).
7. See supra note 3; see also Note, Indigent's Right to Appointed Counsel in Civil Litiga-
tion, 66 GEO. L.J. 113, 117-20 (1977) (examining California and New York's efforts to deal
with indigent civil litigant's right to counsel); Johnson & Schwartz, Beyond Paine: The Case for
a Legally Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants,
Part One: The Legal Arguments, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 249, 251 (1978) (proposing solution to
California's requirement of appointed counsel in certain civil proceedings); Note, The Emerg-
ing Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 554,
562-68 (1976) (outlining judicial developments concerning indigent civil litigant's right to
counsel); Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 547-58
(1967) (addressing civil litigant's need and right to counsel); Comment, The Right to Counsel
in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1325-36 (1966) (examination of theoretical sup-
port for indigent civil litigant's right to counsel).
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The expanding right to counsel for civil
litigants should be of special concern to lawyers. In many instances the newly established right
to counsel is not accompanied by a provision for payment of the appointed counsel. As a
result, a lawyer suffers another burden on their time without any expectation or basis for
demanding payment. See infra note 158 (cases holding appointed counsel has no right to
compensation when no statute authorizes compensation).
9. See, e.g., Gilbert & Gorenfeld, The Constitution Should Protect Everyone-Even Law-
yers, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 90-93 (1984) (arguing appointed counsel deserve fair compensa-
tion for their time) [hereinafter Gilbert & Gorenfeld]; Comment, Court Appointment of
Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 366, 390 (1981) (concluding constitution does not prevent appointment of counsel)
[hereinafter Comment]; Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Consti-
tutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710, 712, 721-26 (1972) (arguing uncompen-
sated appointed counsel deprived of constitutional guarantees of due process, property, and
freedom from involuntary servitude); Williams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exer-
cise of Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32, 45-52 (1971) (asserting Mississippi's lawyers and indigent
clients deprived of constitutional guarantees by inadequate compensation scheme); Note, Indi-
gent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Compensated Counsel, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
433, 435-38 (1967) (claiming appointed counsel deserves more than compensation for out of
pocket expenses); Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel. They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Man-
date, 49 A.B.A.J. 435 (1963) (Senator Ervin's proposal for compensation of appointed
counsel).
10. Eg., Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821 n.6, 104 L. Ed. 2d 318,
329 n.6 (1989) (Supreme Court declines to address constitutional dimensions to unpaid ap-
pointments); United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting argument that unpaid appointments violate fifth and thirteenth amendments);
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citing possible violations of the lawyer's constitutional rights. Ten years
ago, these courts would have concluded differently. 12
This Comment supplements earlier works that discussed the constitu-
tional rights of attorneys appointed for little or no compensation. 13 This
Comment will not, however, express an opinion on the desirability of
mandatory pro bono programs' 4 or their use as an alternative to compulsory
court appointment.' 5 Numerous qualified sources exist for an examination
Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983)
(declaring absence of compensation should not be factor in decision to appoint counsel); Wil-
liamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding unconstitutional state
court's ruling that appointed counsel pay for expenses arising from appointment); White v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379-80 (Fla. 1989) (addressing constitutional
implications of court appointment with statutory cap on compensation and concluding indi-
gent's rights and not attorney's rights give rise to constitutional reason for exceeding maxi-
mum); Postma v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 439 N.W.2d 179, 181-82 (Iowa 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
278 (1989) (overruling claim that statutory cap on compensation threatens rights of indigent
litigants); State ex re. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 842 (1987) (holding
statutory system of compensation for appointed counsel unconstitutional); State ex rel. Scott
v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (holding unpaid appointment of counsel
violates Missouri Constitution); Huskey v. State, 743 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tenn. 1988) (rejecting
claim that statutory cap on fees violates Constitution but expressing sympathy for lawyers
shouldering burden of appointment). But see Anderson, Court-Appointed Counsel: The Con-
stituionality of Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 503, 506, 531 (1990) which
re-examines the constitutional issues and concludes unpaid appointments are constitutional.
Anderson rejects constitutional challenges in part because acknowledgment of these challenges
engenders a detrimental erosion of the professional status of lawyers. Id. at 531. What Ander-
son's argument fails to acknowledge is the practical disappearance of "professional" vestiges
accorded to attorneys. See infra notes 92, 120-95 and accompanying text (detailing changed
nature of legal practice).
11. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Delisio v. Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987) (overturning prior
rulings and holding unconstitutional statute which requires attorney to represent indigent de-
fendant without reasonable compensation); State ex reL Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 850
(Kan. 1988) (invalidating as unconstitutional existing compensation system for appointed
counsel after approving it just five years earlier); see also Comment, supra note 9 (work on
constitutionality of court appointment published too early to discuss new developments). But
see Anderson, supra note 10 (writing on same topic as this Comment and reaching different
conslusion; Anderson article published during writing of this Comment).
13. See supra note 9.
14. See generally NEw YORK CITY BAR ASs'N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAWYER'S PRO
BONO OBLIGATIONS, Report: Toward a Mandatory Contribution of Public Service Practice by
Every Lawyer 5-6 (1979) (offering unsuccessful recommendation that all New York City law-
yers be obligated to tender unpaid legal services to poor); ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON PUBLIC
INTEREST PRACTICE, RECOMMENDATION, 100 REPORTS OF ABA 965-67 (1975) (ABA posi-
tion of encouraging but not requiring unpaid service by the bar); ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON
PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE, Implementing the Lawyer's Public Interest Practice Obligation 3-
7 (1977) (noting several possible solutions to public service dilemma); ABA COMM. ON EVAL-
UATION OF PROF. STDS., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 180 (Proposed Final
Draft, May 30, 1981) (documenting ABA's short-lived effort to update Model Rules to include
requirement of public service for its members). This Comment's author feels that, due to their
unique abilities, all lawyers have a responsibility to serve the indigent and improve the admin-
istration of justice.
15. The author perceives this use of mandatory pro bono time to be both paternalistic and
unlikely. The elimination of the Kutak Commission's original mandatory pro bono publico
requirement in its proposed draft of the Code of Professional Responsibility and state bars'
inaction indicate that enforced pro bono work likely will not happen on a wide scale. The
spectre of state bar associations mandating pro bono publico service, however, raises the inter-
esting question of whether such a system would have constitutional problems. Lawyers have
1990] 1231
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of these topics. 16
This Comment instead will analyze the court appointment issue and spe-
cifically explore whether courts may constitutionally compel an attorney to
provide legal representation for indigent clients. Part II discusses the ex-
panding right to counsel granted to indigents by the federal courts; 17 Part
III explores the historical background of court appointment and the sources
of the attorney's traditional obligation to serve the indigent; Part IV analyzes
the three primary constitutional challenges to court appointment and the
judicial responses to those challenges. Finally, this Comment proposes a so-
lution to the issue of uncompensated court appointment which resolves the
constitutional challenges to compulsory representation and provides attor-
neys with their constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection
under the law.
II. THE EXPANDING RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Protection for Criminal Defendants
The expansion of the constitutional right to counsel is primarily responsi-
ble for altering the reality and number of court appointments in the twenti-
eth century.' 8 The well spring for the modern constitutional right to counsel
is Gideon v. Wainright,19 which marked a turning point in the Court's treat-
ment of an indigent criminal defendant. In Gideon the Court overturned an
earlier decision 20 granting an indigent criminal defendant the right to coun-
sel only in capital proceedings. 21 The Gideon Court instead held that a con-
stitutional right to counsel exists for all indigent defendants in all felony
prosecutions. 22
After Gideon the Court continued to expand the right to counsel in crimi-
nal proceedings. In Miranda v. Arizona 23 and United States v. Wade,24 the
Court established the indigent's right to counsel at the earliest phases of the
criminal process. 25 Adhering to the import of these decisions, in Mempa v.
previously challenged mandatory dues for bar association membership. See Lathrop v. Dono-
hue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961).
16. See supra note 5.
17. Not to be overlooked are state court decisions which also have considerably expanded
the indigent civil litigant's rights. See infra notes 48-54.
18. Recent Supreme Court decisions have noted the importance of this right. See, e.g.,
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (lack of counsel undermines fairness of
judicial process); United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-57 (1984) (right to counsel is
"most pervasive" of all the rights granted in Constitution) (quoting Schacter, Federalism and
State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 686 (1984) (establishing standards determining constitutionally deficient representation).
See generally Schacter, Federalism & State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956)
(asserting that right to counsel is most important right in Constitution).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (case presages
Gideon); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (same).
20. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
21. Id. at 465.
22. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (counsel must be available during custodial interrogation);
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Rhay 26 the Court held that indigent criminal defendants have a right to
counsel at preliminary hearings. 27 In the early 1970s, the Court granted the
right to counsel to defendants to misdemeanor charges where imprisonment
is actually imposed,28 and to indigent defendants at parole revocation hear-
ings. 29 Douglas v. California 30 finalized the expansion of the right to counsel
in criminal proceedings. In Douglas the Court held that the criminal defend-
ant has a right to counsel in a first appeal of right.31
After two decades of vigorously championing the indigent defendant's
rights, the Court in the 1980s halted its expansion of these rights. In Penn-
sylvania v. Finley 32 the Court held that an indigent defendant does not have
a right to counsel in a collateral attack upon his conviction.33 Similarly, the
Court, in Murray v. Giarratano,34 held that an indigent defendant has no
right to counsel in a state post-conviction action for relief.35 These two
cases, however, marked the extent of any retreat from providing legal serv-
ices to the criminal defendant forged by the Court. The rights established in
earlier cases, 36 therefore, remain good law.
B. Expansion to Civil Litigants
While the Supreme Court in the 1960s acted to provide appointed counsel
to the indigent defendant in criminal cases, the lower federal courts gener-
ally refrained from appointing counsel in civil cases. In United States v.
Madden 37 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held appointment of counsel
a privilege rather than a right for civil litigants. 38 Appointment in civil
cases, therefore, remained a matter for the discretion of the trial court,
whose decision would not be reversed unless fundamental unfairness re-
sulted.39 Similarly, another federal court recommended caution in court ap-
pointment by recognizing that the hardship weighed upon the appointed
counsel should be considered by the court when appointing counsel in a civil
case.4o
Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37 (right to counsel at post-indictment lineup). See also cases cited
supra note 2 (discussing earlier cases regarding time in criminal process when indigent obtains
right to counsel).
26. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
27. Id at 136.
28. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
29. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973) (determination of right to counsel in
parole revocation cases to be made on case by case basis); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 n.16 (1972) (due process may require counsel at probation revocation hearing
but Court declines to address issue).
30. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
31. Id. at 358.
32. 481 U.S 551 (1987).
33. Id at 559.
34. 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).
35. Id. at 109 S. Ct. at 2771-72, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 13.
36. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
37. 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965).
38. Id. at 793.
39. Id.
40. See Spears v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (S.D. W.Va. 1967).
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Less than ten years after Madden, however, the Ninth Circuit changed its
position. In Cleaver v. Wilcox 41 the court considered the indigent parent's
right to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights. Although the
court held no constitutional right to counsel existed in the case as presented,
the Ninth Circuit formulated a test to use in future cases involving applica-
tions for counsel.42 After Cleaver, a district court could appoint counsel in a
parental rights proceeding upon weighing the possible length of separation
from the child, the absence of parental consent, and the parent's ability for
self-representation. 43
Cleaver represented an important precursor to the landmark Supreme
Court decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.44 In Lassiter the
Supreme Court for the first time acknowledged that an indigent civil litigant
has a right to counsel in certain cases where the state is the opposing party.45
The Court announced a sliding scale test which declared that the indigent's
right to counsel in civil cases decreased in proportion to the decrease in the
threat to his personal liberty." The Court held, moreover, that a presump-
tion in favor of appointing counsel exists when the indigent risks being de-
prived of liberty upon losing the case. 47
State courts, however, have gone much further than Lassiter. In New
York, for example, an indigent civil litigant automatically possesses a right
to counsel in parental rights cases,48 in litigation involving "a substantial
amount of money,"'49 in cases involving a possible eviction, 50 and in matri-
monial litigation.51 California is similarly progressive. In California, an indi-
gent civil litigant is entitled to counsel in parental rights termination cases52
and in paternity actions filed by the state.53 These developments demon-
strate the significant national expansion in the right to counsel and the wide-
spread demand for the continued growth of this right.54
41. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 945.
43. Id. at 945-46.
44. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
45. Id. at 26; see also Little v. Streeter, 452 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1981) (companion case to
Lassiter); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979) (earlier case holding that sixth amend-
ment does not compel appointment of counsel where law authorizes imprisonment as penalty
but it is not imposed); English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1981) (holding right
to counsel in civil proceedings includes availability of funds to make possible reasonably neces-
sary investigative services).
46. 452 U.S. at 27.
47. Id.
48. E.g., In re Ella R. B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 357, 285 N.E.2d 288, 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133,
136 (1972).
49. E.g., Davis v. Hanna, 97 A.D.2d 943, 944, 468 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983).
50. E.g., Hotel Martha Washington Mgmt. Co., v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322
N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (N.Y. App. Term. 1971).
51. E.g., In re Farrell, 127 Misc. 2d 350, 486 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
52. E.g., In re Jacqueline H., 21 Cal. 3d 170, 175-76, 577 P.2d 683, 696-97, 145 Cal. Rptr.
548, 551-52 (1978).
53. Eg., Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 537, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
54. See Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 8, at 78 n. 13 (noting numerous commentators
favoring right to counsel for litigants in all civil cases).
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III. THE HISTORY OF COURT APPOINTMENT AND THE LAWYER'S
RESPONSIBILITY
Courts traditionally look at the historical obligations of the bar when
forced to justify both their power of appointment and the lawyer's duty to
serve.5" Although some commentators have uncovered in Roman history
56
questionable support for this premise, most courts rely on the English and
American history of court appointment as justification for this practice.57
A. The English Tradition
Many American courts consider the English history of court appointment
as unqualified support for attorneys' continuing obligation to accept court
appointments. 58 Courts and commentators alike assert that the history of
court appointment in England establishes the bar's obligation to serve the
indigent without payment.59 The English system, however, does not conclu-
sively establish the bar's obligation to serve the indigent upon request. Two
thorough examinations of the English history of court appointment clearly
assert that an irrefutable tradition of court appointment is not part of that
history.6°
The earliest reported cases betray a mixed response by the courts when
faced with an occasion requiring appointment. 61 A number of cases dating
back as far as the sixteenth century indicate that defendants frequently had
to implore the court for the assistance of counsel, but oftentimes to no
avail. 62 This result was not always the case, however. As noted in United
55. See generally R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 230, 230-33 (2d ed. 1921) (noting
tendency of courts to use historical obligation of bar to justify power to appoint and duty to
serve). But see Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 17 (1854) (concluding that historical basis for court
appointment vanished by 1854 because profession was "properly stripped of all its odious dis-
tinctions and peculiar emoluments").
56. Eg., Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 385 (1923) (foot-
note omitted); 2 H. ROsY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 407 (1902); 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW
IN THE MODERN WORLD 455 (2d ed. 1924). For criticism of this view and a very thorough
documentation of this topic, see Shapiro, supra note 5, at 739-62.
57. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (lawyers required to accept
appointments as officers of court); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636-37 (9th Cir.
1965) (appendix) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); State v. Clifton, 247 La. 495, 172
So.2d 657, 667 (1965) (same).
58. See infra note 73.
59. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 637-38 ("The tradition of representation of indigents in England
has existed for nearly half a millennium." Id. at 637.).
60. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL ADVICE IN ENGLAND AND
WALES, 7, 11 (1945) (circumstances dictate whether counsel appointed) [hereinafter REPORT
OF THE COMM.]; Shapiro, supra note 5, at 740-49 (until eighteenth century, counsel usually not
appointed in criminal cases).
61. C. ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 256-59 (1974) (originally published c.
1530); E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 29, 137
(4th ed. 1669).
62. See, e.g., Lord Lovat's Case, 18 How. St. Tr. 529, 578-79 (1746) (blind, deaf invalid
denied counsel); Scroop's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 1034, 1043-46 (1660) (incarcerated defendant
required to represent self); Love's Case, 5 How. St. Tr. 43, 54-66 (1651) (inability to solicit
counsel does not constitute denial of counsel); Howard's (Duke of Norfolk's) Case, 1 How. St.
Tr. 957, 966-67 (1571) (defendant accused of high treason denied counsel).
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States v. Dillon,63 some English statutes and case law support the proposition
that certain attorneys, as officers of the court, were obligated to render un-
paid services to the indigent.64
Unlike lawyers of today, in both England and the United States, 65 an of-
ficer of the court was usually a sergeant-at-law and thus a holder of public
office. 66 A sergeant-at-law enjoyed unusual privileges not granted to other
members of the bar. For example, sergeants commanded higher than nor-
mal fees, served as the exclusive source of appointment to the bench, and,
until the nineteenth century, maintained an exclusive practice in the Com-
mon Pleas.67 In short, sergeants formed a special strata within their own
exclusive profession. 68
With minor exceptions, 69 this elite body alone bore the burden of
mandatory service to the indigent. The reliance by many courts on the long
history of court appointment thus appears to be misplaced. 70 Although
mandatory court appointment indeed burdened some especially privileged
members of the legal profession, the claim is unwarranted that this isolated
occurrence supports an obligation by all attorneys today.7'
B. The American Experience: Abandonment of the English System
The history of court appointment in the United States reflects a general
reluctance by courts to relinquish their power to appoint counsel without
63. 346 F.2d 633, 636-37 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
64. See Anonymous v. Scroggs, 1 Freeman 390, 89 Eng. Rep. 289, 289 (K.B. 1674), where
Chief Justice Hale stated, "if the Court should assign [a sergeant] to be counsel, he ought to
attend; and if he refuse... we would not hear him, nay, we would make bold to commit him
...." (perhaps an early example of mandatory court appointment); Anonymous, 12 Mod. 583,
88 Eng. Rep. 1535 (K.B. 1702) (court appoints counsel for plaintiff who cannot enlist one).
But see Shapiro, supra note 5, at 740-49 (extensive criticism of both Dillon's selective use of
case law and proposition that counsel always appointed for indigent in England).
65. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 484-92 (4th ed. 1936)[here-
inafter Holdsworth]; see also T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
226 (1956); M. BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW (1960) (both noting that English courts
abandoned sergeant-at-law system during nineteenth century).
66. Holdsworth, supra note 65, at 486.
67. Id.; see also Leigh's Case, 15 Va. (I Munf.) 468, 482 (1810) (noting "a difference [in
the status of attorneys] may probably exist in this country"); Respublica v. Fisher, 1 Yeates
350, 350-51 (Pa. 1794) (officers of court also immune from suit, service in militia, and, unlike
other subjects, could not be compelled to take office against their will).
68. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 746 (sergeants "constituted the elite not only among all Eng-
lish lawyers but among members of the bar who tried cases in the King's courts").
69. REPORT OF THE COMM., supra note 60, at 6. The Committee noted:
[flor many years, and perhaps from time immemorial, there has existed the
practice of granting "dock briefs." That is to say a prisoner on indictment has
been entitled to the service in his defence of any barrister who happens to be in
court at the time when he is in the dock on tendering to counsel the sum of one
guinea without the intervention of a solicitor. A barrister so selected is under an
obligation to accept the brief.
Id.
70. See United States v. Dillon, supra note 63, at 637 ("[T]he obligation of counsel to
serve indigents is an ancient and established tradition of the legal profession").
7 1. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 749. Shapiro noted, "But I think enough has been said to
conclude that the case for compulsory, gratuitous service by American lawyers in particular
cases or on a broader scale cannot be based in substantial part on the English tradition." Id.
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compensation. 72 American courts rely in part on the fiction of a firm tradi-
tion of court appointment in England as a justification for their own appoint-
ment of counsel with little or no compensation.73 Although commentators
continue to disagree over the extent of the right to counsel during the colo-
nial period,'7 4 the history of the time manifests a relative departure from the
English tradition.75 The colonial legislatures, unlike the English Parliament,
acted with great frequency to produce a variety of statutes creating an enti-
tlement to counsel.
For example in Georgia the legislature, rather than the courts, adopted
the uncertain English tradition76 of limiting the appointment of counsel in
criminal cases. 77 In South Carolina, the right was much more expansive.
South Carolina law after 1731 permitted courts to assign up to two counsel
to indigents requesting legal assistance. 78 North Carolina was almost as pro-
gressive. In North Carolina, any accused, no matter the nature of his crime,
was entitled to representation by counsel.79 Other states, however, ignored
such developments. Delaware and Pennsylvania, for example, limited the
right to counsel to certain prosecutions at the request of the accused and
perhaps still at the discretion of the court.80
72. For a thorough analysis of the history of court appointment, see generally W. BEA-
NEY, The RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955) (comprehensive history of indi-
gent's right to counsel) [hereinafter Beaney]; Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to
Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048-51 (1964) (applying history to
substantiate argument for extension of indigent's right to counsel).
73. See, e.g., White v. Board of Co. Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379-80 (Fla. 1989) (rely-
ing on officer of court theory which emanates from English common law); State v. Remeta,
547 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (relying on officer of court theory); Ex parte
Dribble, 279 S.C. 592, 310 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating lawyers are officers of
court); Yarborough v. Superior Ct., 150 Cal. App. 3d 388, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1983),
vacated, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) (stating in dicta that lawyers
are officers of court).
74. See Note, supra note 72, at 1030, 1055-57 (appendix setting forth each colony/state's
counsel provisions until 1800); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 750 (whether counsel appointed varied
among colonies); Beaney, supra note 72, at 14-22 (no proof that American courts applied more
liberal right to counsel than their English counterparts).
75. See Note, supra note 72, at 1030 (all states except Rhode Island and Georgia adopted
some right to counsel provision by 1789).
76. See supra notes 59-71 (demonstrating that indigent defendent in England could not
always rely on obtaining appointed counsel).
77. See Beaney, supra note 72, at 19 (Georgia followed English rule from at least 1754
through 1798). But see GA. CONST. art. III, § 8 (1798) ("no person shall be debarred from
advocating or defending his cause before any court or tribunal, either by himself or counsel, or
both").
78. 7 & 8 Will. 3, 3 S.C. PUB. LAWS 129-30 (Grimke ed. 1790) (the law "authorized and
required... [the court] ... to assign... such and so many council not exceeding two, as the
person or persons [accused of a crime] shall desire, to whom such council shall have free access
at all reasonable times").
79. 1 N.C. REV. LAWS 225 (Iredell & Martin ed. 1804). The statute passed in 1777 pro-
vided, "[E]very person accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to
counsel in all matters which may be necessary for his defence, as to facts as to law .... Id.
The last phrase in this statute deserves explanation. In England, an accused was sometimes
deprived of the right to counsel on matters of fact. The courts deemed an accused capable of
defending himself on these matters. The courts, therefore, at varying times only considered
matters of law to be sufficiently complex to warrant an appointment of counsel for the accused.
For more on this distinction, see Note, supra note 72, at 1022-30.
80. See PENN FRAME OF Gov., Laws Agreed upon in England, art. VI (1682); 5 THORPE
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This brief examination of the early history of court appointment in
America indicates that no definite tendency can be culled from an examina-
tion of available materials."1 Claims that colonial courts appointed counsel
solely on the basis of an English tradition appear unsubstantiated. Further-
more, although some courts have been inclined to describe this historical
background as definitive support for the right of the accused to counsel, a
thorough examination of the period concludes otherwise.8 2
1. The 19th Century: Challenges to Appointment Begin
The birth of the nation neither disturbed the Colonies' existing framework
for appointment of counsel nor prevented Congress from acting to provide
counsel. Indeed, the first Congress passed a measure authorizing the ap-
pointment of counsel for defendants in capital cases.8 3 Moreover, Dela-
ware's 1776 Constitution specifically retained all earlier acts of the state
legislature, including those providing for counsel.84 Additionally, Penn-
sylvania retained its rudimentary provisions for counsel, 5 and nothing indi-
cates that the progressive states of South and North Carolina abandoned
their novel extensions of the right to counsel.86
Against this background of colonial legislation, the United States sup-
planted existing state measures, at least in the federal courts, with the pas-
sage of the sixth amendment.87 The importance of appointed counsel was
not lost upon the members of the constitutional convention.88 Three states
proposed different versions of the sixth amendment to the convention.8 9 The
final version of the amendment, however, which passed with almost no de-
bate,90 also indicates that the drafters decided to abandon the fact-law dis-
3060; DEL. LAWS 30, 32 (Franklin & Hall ed. 1752) (1720 statute requires assignment of
counsel in capital cases). But see note, supra note 72, at 1056-57 (concluding all defendants
could obtain counsel).
81. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 753.
82. Id. (Shapiro fails to denote adherence to English tradition of court appointment). But
see note, supra note 72, at 1030-31 (finds dubious inference that colonies did not regard right to
counsel as fundamental).
83. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 29, 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 112 (current version at
18 USC. § 3005 (1988)) (implying that defendant had right to counsel).
84. DEL. CONST. art. XXIV (1776); 1 THORPE 566. The 1792 Delaware Constitution
went further by providing criminal defendants' attorneys the right to seasonable access to their
clients. DEL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 7, 12 (1792).
85. PENN. CHARTER art. V (1701); J. THORPE 3079. In addition, both New Jersey and
Rhode Island had comparable statutes. See 2 R.I. COLONIAL RECORDS 238-39 (Bartlett ed.
1857); R. I. REV. PUB. LAWS 80-81 (1798).
86. See supra notes 78-79.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[I]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
88. See Rackow, The Right to Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 WM. &
MARY QUART. 1, 21-26 (3d ser. 1954) (excellent legislative history of development of sixth
amendment).
89. See Note, supra note 72, at 1031. (Virginia, North Carolina, and New York proposed
provisions for the right to counsel and refused to ratify the Constitution without its inclusion).
90. See Rackow, supra note 88, at 24-5 (final draft very similar to original proposed
language).
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tinction deemed important by English courts.91
The American lawyers affected by these developments bore no relation to
their English counterparts. The only remaining vestige of the English sys-
tem was the preference for court appointment embodied in state and federal
statutes. Barristers, the closest English counterparts to American litigators,
were officers of the court only if also seargents-of-law 92 and were the object
of hushed respect.
In contrast, American lawyers were admitted easily to the bar and were
subjected to little judicial supervision, 93 whereas English attorneys enjoyed
unusual privileges because of the high standards for admission.94 Moreover,
states abandoned stringent requirements for entrance to the bar because of a
widespread fear of class distinction and exclusivity. 95 Any system reviving
privileges for lawyers as a class would have been suspect, if not an anathema,
to the new American ethic.96 As the court noted in State ex rel Scott v.
Roper,97 "... we cannot transplant the English experience onto American
soil, nor can we merely claim that lawyers are officers of the court .... 98
The absence of special privileges for American lawyers, however, failed to
prevent courts from applying two older rationales, premised upon English
tradition, which supported an attorney's obligation to accept an appoint-
mint without compensation. Courts continued to rely on the officer of the
court theory to justify such appointments.99 Despite the reliability of this
91. See supra note 79 (important difference between issues of fact and law in England
should not be overlooked); Rackow, supra note 89, at 24-26; see generally Beaney, Right to
Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1961) (helpful outline of indigent's his-
torical right to counsel before arraignment); Beaney, supra note 72, at 27-76 (documenting
indigent's right to counsel in federal courts).
92. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 746.
93. See Comment, supra note 9, at 374-75 (American lawyers did not suffer same obliga-
tions placed on English lawyers); see also R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO
MODERN TIMES (1953) (colonies' legal systems totally unlike English system). In sum, ani-
mosity for English institutions and a Jeffersonian fear of professionalism and privilege reduced
the legal profession to a more common status in accordance with the ideals of the young
nation. Many states eradicated the professional status of attorneys altogether. See, e.g., N.H.
REv. STAT. ch. 177, § 2 (1842) (any moral citizen over 21 permitted to practice); 1843 ME.
PUBLIC LAWS ch. 12 (any state citizen of good moral character admitted to practice); Wis.
REv. STAT. ch. 87, § 26 (1849) (any resident of good moral character allowed to practice law);
IND. CONST. art. 7, § 21 (1852) (any voter of good moral character may practice law).
94. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
95. See A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 85-86 (1921)
(public policy against lawyers becoming elitist group outweighed importance of legal
education).
96. See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (providing in pertinent part
"that all men are created equal"); see also Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 16-17 (1854) (interpreta-
tion of new role attorneys played in American system).
97. 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
98. Id. at 766.
99. See, e.g., Vise v. The County of Hamilton, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857) (noting lawyers are
officers of court and "the law confers on licensed attorneys rights and privileges, and with
them duties and obligations, which must be reciprocally enjoyed and performed"); see also In
re Baum, 55 Hun. 611, 8 N.Y.S. 771, 771 (1890) (declaring attorney is officer of court, but not
officer of state); Case of Austin, 5 Rawle 191, 203 (Pa. 1835) (considering whether attorney is
officer of state); Byrne v. Stewart, 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 466, 471-72 (1812) (attorneys not holders
of public office despite existence of several statutes superficially regulating lawyers like public
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theory, however, courts seemed to prefer another rationale. This second ra-
tionale, utilized far more often than the first, imposed the burden of court
appointment on the bar because courts viewed appointment as a traditional
obligation of the bar.100 Courts also held either that lawyers accepted the
obligation to serve without pay when they chose to become members of the
bar' 01 or that the duty to serve without pay arose as an acceptable condition
to the practice of law.' 0 2
The Supreme Court of Indiana addressed and dismissed each of these jus-
tifications in its famous opinion in Webb v. Baird.10 3 Webb represents the
first rejection by a state supreme court of the various theories advanced in
support of compulsory legal assistance. The court recognized the traditional
argument that the attorney has an honorary duty to aid the indigent. 104 The
Webb holding, however, flatly dismissed this claim as ancient and having no
place under the laws of its state or the Constitution.10 5 The court considered
all professions equal and, therefore, none could be subjected to unique bur-
officials). Compare Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202-05 (1979) (considering whether ap-
pointed counsel is federal officer); with In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723-27 (1973) (discussing
role played by attorney as officer of court); and Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405
(1956); and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932); and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866) (all instances where Supreme Court addressed meaning of "officer of
the court").
100. See e.g., Nebb v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 173, 174 (1863) (attorneys bound to represent
indigent when appointed); Posey & Tompkins v. Mobile County, 50 Ala. 6 (1873) (law pro-
vides for appointment but not compensation of counsel); Arkansas Co. v. Freeman & Johnson,
31 Ark. 266, 267 (1876) (attorney's privileged position brings with it duty to serve poor);
Lamont v. Solano County, 49 Cal. 158, 159 (1874) (attorneys have duty to aid destitute); Rowe
v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62, 63-64 (1860) (Field, J.) (rejecting claim for compensation because
lawyer has duty to serve defenseless); Elam v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 348, 350 (1873) (attorney's
obligation to serve poor a source of pride); Johnson v. Whiteside Co., 110 Ill. 22, 24 (1884)
(recognizing that courts possess power and duty to appoint counsel); Vise v. County of Hamil-
ton, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857) (noting that court has power to appoint and compel counsel to aid
poor); Johnston v. Lewis & Clarke Co., 2 Mont. 159, 163 (1874) (recognizing long history of
burden of unpaid appointment); People ex rel. Whedon v. Board of Supervisors, 192 App.
Div. 705, 138, 438 N.Y.S. 483, 483 (1920) (noting that historically attorney considered officer
of court); Presby v. Klickitat Co., 5 Wash. 329, 31 P. 876, 877-78 (1892), overruled, 77 Wash.
2d 660, 466 P.2d 485 (1970) (lawyer has duty to profession, humanity, and justice).
101. See Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, 146-47 (1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); see also Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill. 22, 24-25 (1884)
(lawyer impliedly consents to appointments).
102. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966) (court appointed counsel traditionally uncompensated); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488,
490 (Alaska 1966), overruled, 740 P.2d 439 (Alaska 1987) (duty to serve without pay condition
of legal practice rooted in legal history); Case v. Board of Co. Comm'rs, 4 Kan. 411, 411
(1868) (attorneys, like private parties, cannot look for counties to aid to charitable causes);
State v. Simmons, 43 La. Ann. 991, 10 So. 382, 383-84 (1891) (attorney not entitled to fees
when county is not party to suit); Dismukes v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Miss. 612, 613 (1881)
(court appointed counsel not entitled to compensation); Kelley v. Andrew County, 43 Mo.
338, 342-43 (1869) (county not liable for payment of counsel, and state had not provided for
payment); People ex reL Ransom v. Board of Supervisors, 78 N.Y. 622, 622 (1879) (county
not responsible for attorney's fees claim); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325,
326, 331 (1921) (court follows majority rule that attorneys may be required to tender gratui-
tous service).
103. 6 Ind. 13 (1854).
104. Id. at 16.
105. Id. at 16-17.
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dens or granted special treatment.° 6 Having reached these conclusions, the
Webb court easily held that the legal profession no longer enjoyed an unu-
sual status.10 7
Webb, however, was only one of three early decisions holding on constitu-
tional grounds that an attorney could not be compelled to represent an indi-
gent without compensation. In Carpenter v. Dane County 10 8 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected court appointment without provision for compensa-
tion on roughly the same grounds used in Webb. 109 The Iowa Supreme
Court, relying on the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, "0
similarly held unconstitutional court appointment without provision for
compensation. I I The court considered the right to just compensation a fun-
damental right abridged by such an appointment." 12
The acknowledgement of the just compensation argument by these courts
indicates that some courts were not entirely content with the traditional ar-
guments raised in support of an attorney's obligation to serve the indigent
without pay. These holdings, although later repudiated,' 13 indicate that
constitutional objections to compelled representation were recognized and
accepted at an early date.
Other jurisdictions which continued to recognize the duty to serve with-
out pay formed only a plurality of states in existence at the end of the nine-
teenth century." 4 These same states, moreover, seldom disciplined lawyers
for refusing to serve when appointed without provision for compensation. 15
In addition, commentators at the time split on the issue. 116 For these rea-
106. Id. at 16.
107. Id.
108. 9 Wis. 274 (1859).
109. The Webb court relied on art. 1, § 21 of the Indiana Constitution which declared that
"no man's particular services shall be demanded without just compensation." Webb, 6 Ind. at
15. The Wisconsin Supreme Court similarly employed the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution to justify, as correlative to its power to appoint, its power to pay for an
appointed attorney's services. Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 276-77 (counsel entitled to payment as
indigent is entitled to representation); County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 587 (1861)
(county appointing counsel must pay him). But see Greene Lake Co. v. Waupaca Co., 113 Wis.
425, 89 N.W. 549, 552 (1902) (appointed counsel award limited to prescribed statutory
amount on basis of officer of court theory).
110. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (quoting text of fifth amendment).
111. Hall v. Washington Co., 2 Greene 473, 478 (Iowa 1850).
112. Id. at 478. The court held the county responsible for the attorney's compensation and
stated, "[i]t is a fundamental rule of right, established by the Constitution of the United States,
'that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.'" Id. But
see Samuels v. County of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 536, 538 (1862) (attorney must accept representa-
tion for statutory fee; no just compensation problem presented because lawyers are officers of
law).
113. See Samuels v. County of Dubuque, 13 Iowa 536, 538 (1862) (repudiating earlier hold-
ings in deference to statutory pay schedule and on basis of officer of court theory); Greene
Lake Co. v. Waupaca Co., 113 Wis. 425, 89 N.W. 549, 552-24 (1902) (overruling earlier prece-
dent because of new statutory enactment limiting compensation to set amount computed by
days in trial).
114. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D. Attorneys at Law § 207 (1980).
115. See 36 A.L.R. 3d 1221 (1971 & 1990) (collecting cases on topic).
116. Compare T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 330-31 n.2 (3d ed. 1874) (rely-
ing on advocate's oath for responsibility not "to reject, for any consideration personal to my-
self, the cause of the weak, the stranger, or the oppressed") with J. BISHOP, COMMENTARY ON
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sons, the practice of compelled representation without pay already was los-
ing credence in the nineteenth century.
2. The 20th Century: The Amplified Burdens of Court Appointment
The early judicial responses to challenges against court appointment failed
to dictate the future course. In the twentieth century, more courts recog-
nized that constitutional problems existed with court appointment for both
criminal and civil litigants. Courts grew reluctant to place the same de-
mands on attorneys they once had 1 7 and to exercise their inherent judicial
power to compel attorneys to serve.' 18 A responsiveness surfaced to many
lawyers' pleas that uncompensated service constituted an excessive burden.
The once strong majority of courts willing to command attorneys to serve,
no matter the personal and professional cost, disappeared behind an advanc-
ing wall of statutory and common law.1 19
a. The Changing Nature of the Legal Practice
Most court appointments are no longer a simple matter. In the past, a
criminal defense attorney need only know the rudiments of procedure and
evidence.1 20 The modern system, nurtured by years of evolution in both
common and statutory law, changed this required breadth of knowledge.
Today, as a practical matter, a lawyer faces a series of technical hurdles
when handling a criminal matter. Even the most accomplished criminal de-
fense attorney cannot truthfully claim familiarity with all the complexities of
criminal law.121 Though an attorney's best resource remains his ability to
supply a client with expertise, learning, and cogent thought, this ability
alone is not enough with today's convoluted, specialized practice. 122 For
example, the criminal defense attorney must know the rules of discovery, the
intricacies of search and seizure law, jury selection, conspiracy rules, and the
myriad sciences relied upon by prosecutors to prove their cases. 12 3
The changed nature of law practice compounds this problem. Tradition-
ally, general practice was the norm for most lawyers. Today, very few practi-
tioners continue to carry this flame of the past. 124 An increasingly
THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 179 (2d ed. Boston 1872) (1st ed. 1860) (disagreeing
with Cooley's thesis on constitutional and other grounds).
117. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64,
67-68 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb.
816, 823, 224 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1975).
118. See State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985).
119. See infra notes 153-171 and accompanying text for analysis of these changes in the
law.
120. State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 322 (W.Va 1976).
121. See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (1966).
122. See State ex re. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 841 (1987).
123. See Rush, 217 A.2d at 448 (choosing not to compel attorney to render uncompensated
service in part because of increasing complexity of criminal representation and resultant time
burden imposed upon attorney who must familiarize himself with ever-changing face of crimi-
nal law)..
124. See Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 352 Mass. 719, 227 N.E.2d 486, 489 (1967)
(noting fragmentation of profession and increasingly small minority of lawyers who litigate
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specialized and narrowly trained attorney typifies the profession. Many law-
yers appointed to serve the indigent begin their experience relatively incom-
petent.125 For that matter, very few lawyers even specialize in criminal law
or civil litigation. 126
The current practice of law also requires a significant infrastructure not
needed in the past. 127 Lawyers must support the costs of personnel, librar-
ies, equipment, and overhead, leading to a very expensive practice. 128 Also,
in the past lawyers received numerous intangible benefits 29 from represent-
ing the indigent. Today, those benefits largely are gone due to the number of
appointments and the value of lost billable time.' 30 The truth of this state-
ment is illustrated in part by the 30.2% of all lawyers in private practice that
never give any time to pro bono causes. 13
In addition, the competition among lawyers for business is intense.' 32 This
factor alone alters the landscape upon which court appointments are made.
A number of developments have irrevocably altered the profession. For ex-
ample, obstacles which hindered competition among lawyers are being re-
moved. 133 The disappearance of many law firms is one indicator of the
competitiveness which characterizes the legal marketplace. Other barriers
to competitiveness, which kept the layperson out of the practice of law, are
also vanishing.' 34 The growth in small claims courts and alternative dispute
cases); cf supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text (noting courts' acknowledgment of tre-
mendous burden of appointment).
125. See generally Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (an example of lawyer's incompe-
tence in failure to comply with procedural rules).
126. See Rush, 217 A.2d at 444 (noting small number of criminal law specialists).
127. Id. at 448 (observing that "the overhead of the average law office probably runs about
40% of gross income").
128. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Superior Ct., 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 198, 146 Cal. Rptr.
880, 886-88 (1978) (Hopper, J., dissenting) (outlining differences in law practice which make
appointments burdensome); State v. McKenney, 20 Wash. App. 797, 582 P.2d 573, 576-78
(1978) (noting immense burden unpaid appointments place upon practitioner); State v. Rush,
46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966) (stating overhead accounts for up to half of an attor-
ney's gross income).
129. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 752 n.236 (typical benefits were notoriety and acquisition
of experience).
130. Id.; see also State v. Allies, 182 Mont. 323, 594 P.2d 64, 65 (1979) (appointed counsel
spends $42,000 of billable time at trial stage alone). But see Lochner, The No Fee and Low Fee
Legal Practice of Private Attorneys, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 431, 444, 449, 462-66 (1975) (con-
cluding that private practice lawyers perform much of low and no fee practice for middle class
as means of gaining experience and clients, thus potentially realizing benefit from such
service).
131. See Handler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger & Ladinsky, The Public Interest Activities of
Private Practice Lawyers, 61 A.B.A. J. 1388, 1389 (1975). On a better note, the study found
that 6.2% of all billable hours spent in private practice are spent on low and no fee cases. Id.
132. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 776.
133. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377 n.35 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S.
881 (1977) (legitimizing advertising by lawyers; asserting that advertising may increase compe-
tition and lower prices for legal services); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780-93
(1975) (disapproving of minimum fee schedule established by local bar as anticompetitive vio-
lation of Sherman Act): Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n Grievance Comm., 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412
N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. 1980) (direct mail solicitation by lawyers is constitution-
ally protected).
134. See Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make
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resolution techniques attest to this fact.135 In addition, the sheer expense of
retaining counsel deters many potential clients even from seeking legal
assistance in the first place. Although lawyers continue to succeed in today's
society,' 36 their sinecure is no longer unassailable.
C. The Growing Demand for Appointed Counsel
Complicating the problems precipitated by the changed nature of law
practice is an increasing need for the provision of legal assistance without
payment. 137 More poor in need of legal assistance exist today than ever
before. 38 In particular, many poor criminal defendants find themselves in
need of legal assistance. Exacerbating this development are the huge annual
increases in crime. In one eleven year period alone, the national crime index
increased 196.9%. 139
Finally, the existing legal aid network' 40 cannot and does not come close
to meeting the needs created by society, the courts, and the relative indiffer-
ence of lawyers to the needs of the poor.' 4 ' Although Congress created the
Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") to provide equal access to the justice
system,' 42 Congress has, within the last four years alone, decreased LSC
funding by twenty-five percent.' 43 Compounding the problems inherent in
reduced funding is the practical absence of LSC activity in most rural
areas. '
Good Neighbors-Or Even Good Sense?, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 203-12 (1980) (noting
serious changes in acceptability of non-lawyers performing traditional lawyer tasks).
135. See Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice
System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 282-83 (1978) (commenting on increasing
availability of small claims courts for those who wish to proceed without counsel).
136. See American Bar Endowment Annual Report, 1978-79, 66 A.B.A. J. 63 (1980)
(claiming over 465,000 lawyers licensed in the United States); see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 4
1980, at BI, col. 1 (estimating number of lawyers at 500,000 in 1980).
137. See generally Swygert, supra note 3, at 1267 (existing legal assistance programs only
provide for twenty percent of thirty million poor in United States).
138. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 457 (106th ed. 1986) (revealing that percentage of population living
underneath poverty line rose from 11.7% in 1979 to 14.4% in 1984). The percentage, how-
ever, may be dramatically understated. Currently, in order to be "poor", a family of four must
earn less than $12,675 annually. See Dallas Morning News, Sept. 27, 1990, at 18a (reporting
Census Bureau guidelines on poverty; also reporting 12.8% poverty rate for 1989).
139. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973 198,
Table 3.51; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIME SURVEY 1989 (gen-
eral overview of crime in United States).
140. Legal aid is generally available through public defender offices, the Legal Services
Corporation, organized efforts sponsored by the local and state bars, and private pro bono
publico efforts.
141. See infra notes 138-139 (noting societal change of mushrooming crime rates).
142. See Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2996j (1982). Congress estab-
lished the Legal Services Corporation and declared that".. . there is a need to provide equal
access to the system of justice in our Nation for individuals who seek redress of grievances
.. " Id.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 97, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 10 ("[T]he corporation should be
continued... but in light of the needs for fiscal restraint, it has reduced its funding level...
resulting in a 25 percent savings . . .."); see also 97 L.A. Daily J., Jan. 17, 1984, at 1, ol. 2
(reporting same development).
144. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 845 (1987) (noting
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One may attempt to dismiss the ill-effects court appointment imposes on
lawyers and their indigent clients by pointing to the existence and availabil-
ity of legal assistance and pro bono publico services for the indigent. This
assertion, however, lacks merit. Courts recognize that legal aid normally is
not available for the prospective civil litigant. 145 Empirical evidence also
disproves the argument that enough legal services exist to meet the needs of
the poor. 146
With the increasing number of persons living in poverty and the decreas-
ing amount of subsidized legal assistance, 147 only twenty percent of the
thirty million poor in the United States receives assistance from legal aid
programs. 148 Obviously, this development directly influences the required
number of court appointments. One example may be found in 444 W. 54th
S. Tenant Association v. Costello.149 Although the defendant in this case did
not procure counsel, the court noted that even if she had sought legal assist-
ance, a legal assistance law firm could not have taken the case due to an
already overwhelming burden and demand for representation in much more
important matters. 150 Because the system established to provide counsel
could not afford to do so, the Costello court was in a sense forced to appoint
counsel for the defendant. 151 The court acted in spite of the normal reluc-
tance by New York courts to assign counsel in civil proceedings. 152
D. The Overdue Advent of Payment for Appointed Counsel
Much of the nineteenth century case law on court appointment held that
disproportionate impact on lawyers in small counties due to funding pattern which benefits
metropolitan areas); see also Cogan, Governor's Perspective, OR. ST. BAR BULL. 1 (Nov. 1988)
(Oregon's governer estimating that 9,000 legal matters cannot be handled by Oregon's rural
legal assistance programs).
145. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 137-145 (with number of poor increasing and amount of subsidized
legal aid contracting, little doubt exists that poor cannot rely on government legal aid for
help).
147. Swygert, supra note 3, at 1267 n.4. Many poor do not seek legal assistance. The
problem may therefore be understated. The poor's reluctance to seek legal help, in turn, may
result from a previous inability to find free legal service or the poor quality of earlier services.
See also THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION AND THE ACITIES OF ITS GRANTEES: A
FACT BOOK 7 (1979) (estimating poor's need for legal services at three times the capacity of
Legal Services Corporation); cf Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A
Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710, 721-23 (1972) (attacking court ap-
pointment system); Williams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?,
42 MIss. L.J. 32, 42-43 (1971) (attacking system of appointed counsel).
148. Swygert, supra note 3, at 1267 n.2.
149. 138 Misc. 2d 5, 523 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
150. 523 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The court stated, "[m]erely because of the sheer volume of work
in the trial courts, and the drain on their limited available funds, these legal service law firms
cannot accept every indigent who presently seeks their sage counsel, especially in the 'land-
lord-tenant' arena." Id.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975) (court
may only appoint counsel to civil litigant in proper case); In re Daley, 123 Misc. 2d 139, 473
N.Y.S.2d 114 (Surrogate's Ct. 1984) (no right to counsel in most civil cases); In re Romano,
109 Misc. 2d 99, 438 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Surrogate's Ct. 1981) (same proposition as Daley).
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the appointed attorney had no action for compensation. 153 Courts relied
upon the "officer of the court" and "traditional obligation of the bar" theo-
ries to support holdings that lawyers may be compelled to render
gratuituous services. 154 In the twentieth century, some state courts contin-
ued to apply these rationales.155 In Texas and Arkansas, for example, both
of which authorize payment of counsel by county authority, some counties
have either neglected to or decided not to establish funds for payment of
assigned counsel.1 56 The state courts, however, have not found this county
action objectionable.1 57 Some federal courts, moreover, have found that an
appointed attorney does not have an action for payment in the absence of
statutory authorization.158
Other states, however, chose to follow the lead of the United States Con-
gress. In the Criminal Justice Act,' 59 Congress established a pay scale for
appointed counsel in federal criminal cases which, despite providing a fee far
below an appointed counsel's normal rate, notably covers the attorney's rea-
sonable expenses.16° North Carolina's statute closely tracks the Criminal
Justice Act provision by providing for limited compensation and reimburse-
ment for out of pocket expenses. '61 The Wisconsin legislature also provided
153. See supra notes 83-116 and accompanying text (examining nineteenth century history
of court appointment).
154. 'See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text (exploring officer of court and tradi-
tional obligation of bar theories).
155. Eg., Huskey v. State, 743 S.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Tenn. 1988) (one of the burdens and
responsibilities of a professional holding license to practice law is to serve the court system as a
sworn minister of justice); Sanders v. State, 276 Ark. 342, 635 S.W.2d 222, 224 (1982) (duty
and responsibility of lawyer to serve); State v. Conley, 270 Ark. 139, 603 S.W.2d 415 (1980);
State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (1980) (lawyers swear to uphold rights of
indigent); Keene v. Jackson County, 3 Or. App. 551, 474 P.2d 777, 778 (1970) (attorneys
aware of professional obligation rooted in history), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971). See also
3 A.L.R.4th 576 (1981) (annotation on topic).
156. See L. SILVERSTEIN, 1 THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 16
(1968).
157. Id. at 16. Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05 (Vernon 1988) (providing set
fees, subject to the discretion of the trial court, for reimbursement of counsel appointed to
represent indigent criminal defendant).
158. See Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965) (attorney not entitled to
compensation absent statute authorizing payment); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1965) (lawyers have ancient obligations to tender
unpaid service); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 284 (2nd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
964 (1961) (holding United States is not liable for appointed counsel's fees).
159. Crim. Justice Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 2, 78 Stat. 552, 553 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)) (providing for compensation up to a $60 hourly rate
for in court time and $40 hourly rate for out of court time; also allowing Judicial Conference
to increase payment for in court time to $75 an hour in judicial districts where higher rate is
justified).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(l) (1988). A deserving note, however, is the discretion vested
in the Judicial Conference to vary compensation by circuit and district in accordance with
local prevailing rates for qualified attorneys. The expenses provision is also particularly impor-
tant in light of potential total expenses. Without such a provision, the appointed lawyer would
be forced to cover various costs, including transcripts, expert witnesses, and travel. The Kan-
sas Supreme Court recently recognized that these costs alone may make the burdens on ap-
pointed counsel unbearable and unconstitutional. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan.
336, 747 P.2d 816, 824-30 (1987).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-9, 15-4.1, 15.5 (1988). See State v. Davis, 270 N.C. 1, 153
S.E.2d 749 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 828 (1987) (explaining statute's operation). See also
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for payment, but at a lesser fee than normally charged in similar
situations. 162
Few states, however, adhere to a standard of limited compensation with
an allowance for expenses.163 Most states limit awards to a moderate
amount computed on the basis of a standardized hourly rate and the reason-
able hours needed for preparation.1 64 This procedure alone represents a
great improvement. A clear majority of states now have established at least
some mechanism for an appointed attorney to recover his fees, albeit at a
reduced rate, and sometimes his expenses.' 65 Twenty-two of these states im-
pose an artificial limit on compensation, and seventeen others allow the
court to decide what constitutes reasonable compensation.' 66 Consequently,
although most states now have some provisions for payment, the fees allot-
ted are low and oftentimes insufficient.' 67
Some state courts literally provoked their legislatures into action by ren-
dering decisions forcing the legislatures to finance legal services for indigents
with a constitutional right to representation.' 68 In cases where the indigent
had an undisputed right to counsel, the state faced the choice of either pay-
State v. Remeta, 547 So. 2d 181, 181-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (applying another state's
statutory scheme for compensation).
162. Wis. STAT. ANN § 967.06 (West 1985); Wis. S. Cr. R. 81.01-2 (1989); see also State v.
Sidney, 66 Wis. 2d 602, 225 N.W.2d 438 (1975) (detailing effect of statute). Wisconsin cur-
rently compensates appointed counsel at the generous rate of $60 per hour. Wis S. CT. R.
81.02 (1989).
163. See Silverstein, supra note 113, at 17 (noting that only nine states support payment for
a lawyer's expenses, while prescribing certain types of covered costs and limiting recovery to
representation in certain cases). Silversteins' statistics, although accurate when published, are
becoming inaccurate due to movement by state courts. See, e.g., Delisio v. Superior Ct., 740
P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska 1987) (striking as unconstitutional statute which authorizes appoint-
ment without compensation); State ex rel. Stephen v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 842
(1987) (holding statutory compensation rates unconstitutional); State ex. rel. Scott v. Roper,
688 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985) (invalidating state compensation rates for appointments).
164. L. Silverstein, 1 DEFENSE OF THE POOR 16 n.3 (author counts 35 states). For an
example of one state's provisions see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 9960.1-9960.13 (Purdon
Cune. Supp. 1990).
165. Silverstein, supra note 164 (counting 35 jurisdictions). For an example of state stat-
utes establishing a mechanism for appointed attorneys to recover fees see N.Y. COUNTY LAW
§ 722-b (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1990); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 245 (McKinney 1973 & Cum.
Supp. 1990); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35 (McKinney 1968 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
166. See Silverstein, supra note 113, at 17-30.
167. Id. In the 24 states that limit the fee in non-capital cases, the maximum ranges from
$25 to $500. For states that limit fees in capital cases, the maximums range from $500 to
$1500. Id. But see White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379-80 (Fla. 1989)
(approving trial court's fee award in excess of statutory maximum); People ex rel. Conn. v.
Randolph, 35 Il. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966) (exceeding statutory maximum for
awards in unusual case); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 824-30
(1987) (noting that attorneys do not recover even costs of overhead when serving appoint-
ment); Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1271-73 (Okla. 1977) (recognizing that courts may exceed
statutory maximum in cases where attorney unduly imposed upon).
168. See State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (en banc) (threatening not to
appoint attorneys without provision for compensation thereby forcing legislature to act); State
ex reL Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 321-23 (W. Va. 1976) (refusing to permit unpaid
appointments after set future date and advising legislature to act); see also Allen v. McWil-
liams, 715 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tenn. 1986) (advancing new rules for compensation in misdemeanor
cases); Johnson v. City Comm'n, 272 N.W.2d 97, 101 (S.D. 1978) (holding attorneys entitled
to reasonable compensation simultaneously with legislative action compelling counties to pro-
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ing for counsel's services or risking a possible reversal of any conviction
where counsel was not provided.' 69
Although on first glance these statutes appear to solve any potential con-
stitutional problems, application of the statutes leaves the appointed counsel
relatively undercompensated, if compensated at all. 170 In addition, recent
constitutional challenges to existing provisions for payment of appointed
counsel indicate that the advent of these statutes failed to diffuse the issue.17
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF
COURT APPOINTMENT WITHOUT PROVISION FOR
COMPENSATION
The changed nature of legal practice, the poor's increasing demand for
legal services, the lack of a network to provide for the needs of the poor, and
the increasing number of court appointments make the constitutional issues
surrounding court appointment more compelling today than ever before.
Each of these factors amplifies what once was a tolerable inconvenience but
what now is a significant burden on appointed counsel. Courts' recognition
of these changes has led to a new sympathy toward constitutional challenges
by attorneys to such appointments.
In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon,'7 2 some
courts questioned the appropriateness of appointing counsel without provi-
sions for adequate compensation. 17 3 These decisions, however, by no means
represent a majority, and many courts refuse to find constitutional or other
challenges to mandatory court appointment compelling or even cogniza-
ble. 174 Even today, many courts fail to recognize that when an indigent de-
vide it). But see State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 335, 602 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1980) (defering to
legislative determination).
169. See generally State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 449 (1966) (noting that "the
'necessary expenses' of the prosecution are the burden of the county. Within that category
must fall the expense of providing counsel for an indigent accused, without which a prosecu-
tion would halt and inevitably fail under Gideon .... ); Johnson v. City Comm'n, 272 N.W.2d
97, 101 (S.D. 1978) (state bound to pay costs of prosecution including fees of appointed
counsel).
170. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Delisio v. Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) (constitutional attack on
appointment system); State v. Ruiz, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980) (constitutional chal-
lenge to compensation scheme); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816
(1987) (challenge to statutory system as applied); State ex ret. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757
(Mo. 1985) (en banc) (same); Huskey v. State 743 S.W.2d 609 (Tenn. 1988) (constitutional
challenge to provision providing reasonable compensation to appointed counsel).
172. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
173. Eg., Spears v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (in dicta,
mentioning advisability of weighing hardship on counsel when appointed); In re Smiley, 36
N.Y.2d 433, 441, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57-58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92-93 (1972) (recognizing that
power to appoint counsel is oftentimes a matter of discretionary authority which should not be
used too frequently because it "might... be unfair to the Bar to impose such a burden on
them"); cf supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text (asserting that changed nature of law
practice has made burdens more severe).
174. See Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (re-
jecting challenge to court appointment, however, noting that repeated appointments may rep-
resent an unreasonable burden); In re Farrell, 127 Misc. 2d 350, 486 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (following Moultrie and rejecting constitutional challenge).
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fendant's constitutional right to equal protection is threatened because he
may not receive a fair trial without representation by counsel, 175 the counsel
appointed to represent him without pay also may have constitutional rights
threatened. 1 76
A. Involuntary Servitude
In what appeared a landmark decision in In the Matter of Nine Applica-
tions for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings,177 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama held unconstitu-
tional and void a Title VII provision178 granting courts the discretion to
compel representation without provision for payment. 79 The court consid-
ered an application for appointment by several complainants who claimed
indigency and who sought counsel under the Title VII provision. The court,
taking a very bold stance, °80 held the Title VII provision unconstitutional
because it allowed for the creation of a form of involuntary servitude prohib-
ited by the thirteenth amendment. 181
The court relied upon the factual determination that appointment in this
case would be compulsory. 8 2 The court was influenced both by the absence
175. See Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2768-69, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11 (1989); Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1985).
176. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 771 (noting that constitutional challenges to court ap-
pointment are "grounded in the failure to provide adequate compensation"). The constitu-
tional questions raised by compulsory court appointment represent only a few of the problems
with the system. Some commentators have noted that an uncompensated appointed counsel
may not deliver effective legal assistance to the indigent he is appointed to serve. See Com-
ment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgres-
sion, 60 Ky. L.J. 710, 721 (1972) (asserting that appointed counsel would not "devote as much
time and effort to that defendant's case as he will to the case of a paying client .... ); Gilbert
& Gorenfeld, supra note 6, at 85-88 (same). But see State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan.
336, 747 P.2d 816, 843 (1987) (court dismisses claim that uncompensated counsel will not
deliver effective service).
Other problems which may occur as a result of the system are economic in nature. Paying
clients will supplement the cost of appointments through increased fees, which ultimately may
prevent some potential clients from seeking legal assistance because of the cost. See Comment,
supra, at 721. Another possible problem of appointments concerns the ill-will an indigent
client may harbor after being represented by an inexperienced young attorney who frequently
is the only one willing to take the appointment. Both the appointed attorney and the indigent
defendant may feel they have been wronged. Id. See generally Williams & Bost, The Assigned
Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32, 35-38 (1971) (outlining myriad
costs suffered by the appointed lawyer); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 777-84 (remarking on eco-
nomic costs of appointment and possible benefits devolving from provision for payment).
177. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceedings, 475 F.
Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979), vacated sub nom., White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646
F.2d 203, 204-07 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Nine Applications].
178. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982) provides that an
indigent complainant may apply "and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the
court may appoint an attorney for such complainant ... 
179. 475 F. Supp. at 88-89.
180. See infra note 185 and accompanying text (indicating most courts reject the district
court's holding).
181. 475 F. Supp. at 88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 provides "[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
182. 475 F. Supp. at 88. See also Rheinstein, Pro Bono Cons, STUDENT LAWYER, March
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of constitutional imperatives of counsel found in criminal proceedings 8 3 and
by the use of the word "appoint" rather than "request" in other federal
statutes. 184
Many courts, however, have not followed the approach of the Alabama
district court to court appointment in civil matters,18 5 and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in fact later vacated the decision.' 86 Circuit courts ad-
dressing the issue of court appointments constituting involuntary servitude
have also rejected the Nine Applications holding.' 8 7
1. The Public Service Exception
The rejection of thirteenth amendment challenges to court appointment
rests on a number of grounds. First, courts frequently rely on forms of the
public service exception to justify uncompensated service by appointed coun-
sel.18 S The public service exception is based on a line of cases permitting the
state to impress its citizens temporarily into service. 18 9 The cases establish-
1990, at 3. Rheinstein finds mandatory pro bono programs voluntarily administered by law
schools objectionable as a form of "involuntary servitude of law students." Id. Rheinstein's
argument, however, seems an illogical extension of established law and appears grounded more
on emotion than on analysis of current law. Rheinstein characterizes students at schools re-
quiring service as "foot soldiers in someone else's crusade." Id. But see MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 2-25 (1980), infra note 216 (remarking that lawyers have
historically donated their time to the poor).
183. 475 F. Supp. at 92.
184. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) (providing that the court "may request an attor-
ney to represent any person [claiming in forma pauperis status and] unable to employ counsel
and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is
frivolous or malicious") with 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (providing for the
appointment of counsel for criminal defendant); 18 U.S.C. § 3503(c) (1988) (assigning counsel
for criminal defendant at deposition); 18 U.S.C. § 4109 (1982) (appointing counsel to indigent
defendant before transfer).
185. The few courts that have accepted this argument did so largely before the holding in
Nine Applications, 475 F. Supp. at 87. See Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 14-15,
447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968) (acknowledging involuntary servitude argument and striking
down uncompensated appointment system). See also Rheinstein, supra, note 182 (characteriz-
ing mandatory participation in pro bono programs at law schools as involuntary servitude).
186. White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1981).
187. See Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moutrie, 725 F.2d 695, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct., 742 F.2d 515, 517 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); Williamson v.
Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1982); White v. United States Pipe & Foundry,
646 F.2d 203, 205 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981).
188. See supra notes 100-102 (courts noting duty of lawyers to serve society).
189. See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1973) (holding threat of
deportation does not create involuntary servitude); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366,
373 (1918) (holding threat of conscription does not create involuntary servitude); Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (holding state's requirement that all able-bodied men contrib-
ute two days of work to improve public roads does not create involuntary servitude); Edwards
v. United States, 103 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1880) (upholding Michigan law barring public officer's
resignation from office without consent of the state). See also Comment, Court Appointment of
Attorneys In Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 366, 380-82 (1981) (describing and analyzing these cases); Shapiro, supra note 5, at
769. Shapiro notes "[w]hatever the thirteenth amendment's lateral reach, its application (in
court appointment cases] may be excluded by a line of decisions upholding the power of the
state to requisition an individual's services to meet a public need." Id. Cf Robertson v. Bald-
win, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (holding that "services which have from time to time immemo-
rial been treated as exceptional" will not be touched by scope of thirteenth amendment).
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ing this exception to the scope of the thirteenth amendment190 look either to
a duty the citizen owes the state or to the sensibility of allowing the state to
call on its citizens in time of need191 to perform state functions.192
The Supreme Court's holding in Hurtado v. United States1 93 virtually
guaranteed application of the public service exception to court appointment
challenges. In Hurtado the Court considered provisions for payment of in-
carcerated witnesses who could not provide for bail. In a decision largely
directed at fifth amendment issues, 194 the Court also set the stage for rejec-
tion of future thirteenth amendment claims. 195 The Hurtado decision jeop-
ardized later court challenges to court appointment because the Court
reinforced the public service exception when applied to criminal justice pro-
ceedings. 196 The Hurtado Court predicated the public service exception on
the public's obligation to provide evidence in criminal cases, a duty analo-
gous to the attorney's duty to represent the indigent. 197
Other public service exception cases uphold conscription, impressment of
labor for road gangs, and a state law prohibiting state employees from quit-
ting their jobs prior to receiving the sanction of their employer. 198 The ap-
plication of the public service exception, however, is not unlimited. A
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision' 99 held that the government's
power to compel public service is restricted by the requirement that the ser-
vice bear a reasonable relation to the state's needs.2co
2. The Nature of the Threat Analysis
Courts also dismiss thirteenth amendment claims by examining the nature
of the threat underlying the alleged servitude. As made clear by the
Supreme Court, the nature of the threat will determine the success of any
thirteenth amendment challenge. 201 In addition, relatively recent interpreta-
190. See infra notes 191-218 and accompanying text.
191. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588-90 (1973). Cf Jobson v. Henne, 355
F.2d 129, 131-32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) (traditional state interests must be furthered when state
compels assistance of citizens).
192. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (defining traditional
state functions), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(rejecting traditional state functions test as anachronistic and proposing new standards for
determining state immunity from federal regulation).
193. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976) (Federal law concerning compensation of witnesses). This
law, along with the potential for incarceration of material witnesses unable to make bail, was
tested under due process standards in Hurtado. 410 U.S. at 588-89.
195. 410 U.S. at 588-89.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1949) (expounding upon pub-
lic's duty to provide evidence when summoned); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438
(1932) (U.S. national required to return to United States when properly summoned to appear
as witness in criminal case).
198. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 373 (1918) (conscription case); Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (road gangs case); Edwards v. United States, 103 U.S. 471,
473-74 (1880) (state law case).
199. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
200. Id. at 132-50.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) (threat must
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tions of the thirteenth amendment foretell the predictable failure of thir-
teenth amendment challenges to court appointment.
In United States v. Shackney20 2 the court of appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the threat of deportation was an insufficient reason to find a condi-
tion of involuntary servitude. 20 3 The court considered the implications of
reaching a different conclusion. According to the court, finding that a form
of involuntary servitude existed would be tantamount to holding that a con-
dition of involuntary servitude existed when an employee worked because of
an employer's threats. 2°4 The court voiced its unwillingness to go that far by
holding that "the statute applies only to service compelled by law, by force
or by threat of continued confinement. '20 5
Another second circuit decision, Flood v. Kuhn,2°6 used the same threat
analysis in a thirteenth amendment claim. In Flood, a baseball player
claimed the baseball reserve system violated the thirteenth amendment. 20 7
The baseball reserve system forced a player to negotiate with the team he
was either employed by or traded to prior to negotiating with any other
team. The court held that since the player chose baseball as his profession,
he was subject to the constraints implicit in that choice. 20 The court found
this factor and the Shackney analysis influential in dismissing the thirteenth
amendment claim.2°9
Recent commentary concludes that these two decisions forclose any claim
that uncompensated appointment forms a condition of involuntary servi-
tude.210 This conclusion, however, overlooks some differences between these
cases and the typical instance where an attorney is called upon to render
gratuitous services. In Flood the player signed a contract obliging him to
adhere to the baseball reserve system;211 attorneys do not sign such a con-
tract.212 In contrast, attorneys are expected to tolerate appointments be-
cause, as attorneys, they are cognizant of the rich tradition supporting the
system of court appointment. 21 3 These two situations are not analogous,
however, because the player purposefully binds himself while the lawyer is
bound by an unclear tradition. In the Flood case, moreover, the player pos-
sessed a certain amount of bargaining power not enjoyed by a hopeful appli-
amount to inescapable confinement for thirteenth amendment to apply); Pollock v. Williams,
322 U.S. 4, 23-24 (1944) (threat of imprisonment for not honoring promise triggers thirteenth
amendment); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149-50 (1914) (threat of resentencing
convict to longer term does not implicate thirteenth amendment).
202. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
203. Id. at 487.
204. Id. at 480.
205. Id. at 487.
206. 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
207. Id. at 265.
208. Id. at 268.
209. Id. at 265-68.
210. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 769.
211. Id.
212. Lawyers are bound only by the rules of the state, local, and American bar associa-
tions; no contract per se exists.
213. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966) (attaching appendix detailing allegedly long history of court appointment).
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cant to the bar. 214 These differences, however, are not sufficient to allow a
thirteenth amendment challenge to succeed.
Application of the public service exception to instances of court appoint-
ment prevents the success of thirteenth amendment challenges. In tradi-
tional public service exception cases, all the members of a large public class
shared equally in the burden. 215 In contrast, only members of the bar are
burdened by court appointment. This objection, however, fails to defeat the
argument. Lawyers commit themselves to service of the needs of the
poor.216 Lawyers also may be aware of this practice upon entry to the
bar. 2 17
Furthermore, stronger constitutional imperatives underlie court appoint-
ment than underlie instances where the state temporarily requires the serv-
ices of its citizens. 218 Courts designed the public service exception to permit
the states flexibility in meeting unusual situations. The constitutional re-
quirement of counsel is such a situation. Only a select group may aid the
state, and states need the flexibility that requiring court appointment pro-
vides. Rejection of thirteenth amendment challenges, therefore, should be
premised on this unusual need.
Lawyers are burdened infrequently by court appointments and do not
have to serve involuntarily all that often. The voluntary nature of the ser-
vice may be imputed from the oath taken upon entrance to the bar. For that
matter, cases of court appointment provide an insufficient threat to form a
condition of involuntary servitude. On the basis of the public service excep-
tion and the nature of the threat, rejection of thirteenth amendment claims
should continue as both warranted and reasonable.
214. See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635-36 (implying lawyers have no bargaining power, holding
that lawyers must shoulder burden of unpaid appointments merely because of their
profession).
215. See supra notes 189-124 and accompanying text (in Perry it was all able-bodied men
and in Edwards it was all public employees).
216. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, EC 2-25 (1980) which states:
[h]istorically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees
has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court
appointments .... The basic responsibility for providing legal services for those
unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer .... Every lawyer,
regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time
to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal services to
those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer
217. See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635 (duty to accept appointments is "a condition under which
lawyers are licensed to practice" of which "[a]n applicant for admission to practice law may
justly be deemed [to be aware]"). But see Shapiro, supra note 5 (criticizing Dillon).
218. Court appointments for criminal cases implicate the fundamental rights of the indi-
gent defendant. Cf Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (establishing right to coun-
sel in most criminal proceedings). But see Davison v. Joseph Home & Co., 265 F. Supp. 750,
752 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (dictum) (citing United States v. Leser, 233 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. Cal. 1964)




B. Due Process Considerations
1. United States v. Dillon
The seminal case rejecting a deprivation of property challenge219 to an
uncompensated court appointment is United States v. Dillon,220 which com-
mands a strong following in both the state and federal courts.221 In Dillon
the court held that lawyers have a professional responsibility to render un-
paid services. 222 This element of the court's opinion received wide acclaim in
various state and federal courts,223 and a recent Eighth Circuit decision also
accepted Dillon's conclusion that all lawyers have a professional obligation
to render unpaid services.224
Dillon, however, has been the subject of much criticism. Scholarly attacks
occur most frequently, 225 one of which characterizes Dillon's reasoning as
219. The claims emanating from an appointment with insufficient provisions for compensa-
tion may be styled as either a due process or deprivation of property without just compensation
challenge. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 837 (1987) (ac-
knowledging potential for dual violations); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665
(1983) (due process analysis often implicates equal protection questions even though inquiries
are distinct).
220. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
221. See White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1981);
Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Dolan v.
United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488, 490 (Alaska
1966). The Supreme Court recently opted not to address the constitutional challenges to court
appointment in Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821 n.6, 104 L. Ed. 2d
318, 329 n.6 (1989), leaving unresolved the status of these challenges. See also Chicago B. &
Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (applying fifth amendment to states).
222. 346 F.2d at 635-36.
223. E.g., Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864(1973) (quoting Dillon); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1971) (lawyer under-
takes implied obligation to represent indigent); State v. Keener, 224 Kan. 100, 577 P.2d 1182,
1184-85 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64,
65-66 (Mo. 1981) (lawyers have professional duty to aid indigent); Penrod v. Cupp, 284 Or.
417, 587 P.2d 96, 97 (1978) (refusing to contravene professional duty to serve poor); Ex parte
Dribble, 310 S.E.2d 440, 441 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983) (lawyers assume obligation to represent
indigent).
224. In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 338-39 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S.
834 (1985) (stating that "[t]he profession of law rests upon its commitment to public service
and has long been recognized as a profession that requires its membership to engage in pro
bono activities"). Cf supra note 216, for the ABA position on the ethical obligation of lawyers
to aid the indigent.
225. This may be due in part to increasing sympathy in the courts for attorneys' pleas to
have maximum limits on compensation waived. See, e.g., White v. Board of County Comm'rs,
537 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989) (court exceeds statutory cap); Makemson v. Martin County,
491 So. 2d 1109, 1110-12 (Fla. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987) (court establishes
guidelines for awards in excess of statutory maximum); State v. Remeta, 547 So. 2d 181, 183
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (not following Makemson due to unexceptional circumstances); Bias
v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1271-73 (Okla. 1977) (allowing courts to exceed statutory maximum
when attorney unduly imposed upon by appointment. For discussions on the scholarly criti-
cisms of the Dillon decision, see Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Legal
Services & The Public, December 7 & 8, 1979 at 21 (1981) (statements of Dan Bradley, then
President of the Legal Services Corporation); Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The
Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438
(1965); Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Public Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs.
J. 1 (1981); Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49
A.B.A. J. 435 (1963); Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 6; Lamkin, Compensation of Appointed
Counsel in Criminal Cases, 19 J. Mo. BAR 412 (1962); Marks, A Lawyer's Duty to Take All
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"fuzzy and unconvincing. ' 226 In addition, one court admonished the Dillon
court both for misreading the history of court appintment and for flatly ac-
cepting the government's brief in support of an obligation on the bar to ac-
cept court appointments.227
A similar undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Dillon's analysis is evident
in other courts.228 Early decisions in at least three states found illusory the
historical obligation touted by the Dillon court.229 Recent decisions in two
states also rejected the Dillon contention,230 and other states rejected the
Dillon holding in particular instances where the burden placed upon an ap-
pointed attorney may become so excessive as to constitute a taking.231 In
addition, a minority of courts held that uncompensated appointments per se
violate the takings clause of the fifth amendment. 232
2. Due Process Analysis
The primary question in a due process analysis must be whether the pro-
gram bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate government objective.233
This question frequently is answered in the affirmative, because the state's
Comers and Many Who Do Not Come, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 915 (1976); Martineau, The
Attorney As An Officer of The Court: Time To Take The Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C.L. REV. 541
(1984); Podgers, Mandatory Pro Bono: Basic Question Remains, 66 A.B.A. J. 280 (1980); Sha-
piro, supra note 5; Smith, Lawyers Who Take Must-At Least a Bit, 1 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 27
(1976); Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases" The Constitutionality of Uncom-
pensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 366 (1981).
226. Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 1, 5 n.14 (1981).
227. State ex. rel Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 763-66 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (undertak-
ing lengthy refutation of Dillon's holding); see also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 776 (asserting that
"the argument from history and tradition ... is a good deal weaker than is sometimes
thought"); supra notes 55-176 and accompanying text (analyzing history of court
appointment).
228. See infra notes 220-62.
229. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
230. See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987); State ex rel
Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985) (disagreeing with Dillon's version of history).
231. See Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 858 (1966); Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 352 Mass. 719, 227 N.E.2d 486, 489
(1967); State ex reL Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (W. Va. 1976); see also Weiner v.
Fulton County, 113 Ga. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
958 (1966) (holding that taking occurred but finding taking not compensable); cf Note, Indi-
gent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Compensated Counsel, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
433, 436-38 (1967) (noting rationales employed by courts to defeat taking claims).
232. See Bedford v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1968) (striking
statute authorizing court to appoint counsel to indigent parties to involuntary hospitalization
proceedings); Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
(asserting that appointed attorney has constitutional right to demand compensation when ap-
pointed in civil case).
233. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 451-86, 506
(1987) (examining Pennsylvania statute imposing liability on mining companies for subsidence
of surface resulting from mining); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-42
(1984) (noting that court will normally not question legislature's judgment as to public use,
rather judicial review begins with question of legislature's action being reasonably related to
public use); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 838 (1987) (applying
analysis suggested by Supreme Court).
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vital interest in promoting justice is at stake.234
Disposal of the first issue permits an examination of the due process rights
of lawyers. Although the Supreme Court has not held that legal services are
a property right, the Court has held that lawyers and other professionals are
entitled to due process in admission and disciplinary proceedings.235 These
holdings appear to establish a property interest in the practice of law.236
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that intangibles may be considered
property in a fifth amendment takings analysis. 237
Lower court decisions have found that a professional's work constitutes
property because thoughts constitute a product.238 Other instances of state
imposition upon the public, however, indicate that services are not always a
form of property. The most frequently cited examples occur with witnesses
and jurors. 239 Courts, however, consistently reject fifth amendment chal-
lenges by persons suing in these capacities. 240 The analogy between the wit-
ness and juror situations and that of an appointed counsel, however, lacks
strength. The duties placed upon witnesses and jurors are universal among
the populace. In addition, the size of the populace makes such impositions
both inexpensive and infrequent.24' By comparison, lawyers constitute the
only class eligible to serve as appointed counsel and the imposition, there-
234. See generally State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 449 (1966) (noting that " ...
the 'necessary expenses' of the prosecution are the burden of the county. Within that category
must fall the expense of providing counsel for an indigent accused, without which a prosecu-
tion would halt and inevitably fail under Gideon ... ."); Johnson v. City Comm'n, 272 N.W.2d
97, 101 (S.D. 1978) (same).
235. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550
(1968); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-89 (1957). But cf Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S.
820, 843 (1961) (upholding payment of membership dues as prerequisite to entrance to bar).
236. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 771.
237. Eg., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912) (chose in
action constitutes property right); United States v. Burns, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246, 252 (1870)
(patent rights are property). But see Gardner v. United States, 446 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir.
1971) (concluding Supreme Court decisions establish property right only in tangible things).
238. See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 26 F. Cas. 394, 394 (W.D. Ark. 1881) (No. 15404a);
Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 346, 148 S.E.2d 143, 145, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
958 (1966); Mount v. Welsh, 118 Or. 568, 585, 247 P. 815, 821 (1921).
239. See State v. Setzer, 92 N.C. App. 98, 256 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1979) (jury service is civic
responsibility); United Dev. Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439, 442 (N.D. 1965)
(witness' right to compensation is statutory only).
240. See Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 8-9, Dillon v.
United States, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). But see the numerous early cases which hold an expert
witness must be compensated for time spent in preparation. Eg., Flinn v. Prairie County, 60
Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459, 460 (1895) (expert entitled to demand extra compensation for prepara-
tion time); Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108, 112 (1897) (noting split in courts over
compensation of expert witness for preparation time); Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 56,
81 N.E. 907, 910 (1907) (noting difference between requiring expert to offer opinion and re-
quiring expert to study in order to form an opinion). One commentator has formulated a
convincing argument analogizing the situation of the appointed attorney to that of an expert
witness. See Note, infra note 243, at 387-89. The author noted, however, that unlike expert
witnesses, lawyers may enjoy "an average reciprocity of advantage" because of the exclusive
nature of the practice of law and the benefits lawyers receive from state regulation. Id. at 388-
89.
241. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 772.
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fore, may be both harsh and frequent.242
The lawyer's predicament is more analogous to the compulsion of expert
witnesses to testify without pay. In this instance, a small group is burdened,
sometimes at great expense, thereby creating a property interest.243 Recent
examinations of the duty of an expert witness to serve without pay ques-
tioned the courts' refusal to accept fifth amendment challenges.2" The in-
ference that no fifth amendment rights are implicated appears debatable, at
best, in light of a recent willingness by the Supreme Court to analyze due
process claims on a case-by-case basis.245 The analogy is also tenuous be-
cause attorneys will be called upon far more often than the typical cadre of
expert witnesses.2 " In addition, the burden on the attorney lasts from long
before the trial until long after,24 7 while the expert witness must testify only
once.
Due process analysis requires the determination that a taking of property
has occurred. The court in Dillon248 readily disposed of this question by
holding that no taking of services occurs with court appointments because
lawyers impliedly consent to gratuitous service upon entering the profes-
sion.249 The court, without comment, relied upon the government's asser-
tion that no taking occurs because lawyers continue to be officers of the
court.
25 0
a The Penn Central Test
Dillon's conclusion appears unsound in light of the Supreme Court's cur-
rent test for examining takings challenges. The Court, in Pennsylvania Cen-
242. See State ex reL Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 832-34 (1987) (detail-
ing specific instances where appointed attorneys had to travel great distances and tender large
sums of money in furtherance of appointed client's cases).
243. See Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Unconstitutionality of
Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 387 (1981) ("professional suffers
the frustration of economic expectations derived from his or her prior investment in special
education and training").
244. See Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 817-22 (2d Cir. 1976); Commonwealth v.
Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 234-36, 327 N.E.2d 819, 827-28 (1975); People ex rel. Kraushaar Bros.
& Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 72 N.E.2d 165, 166 (1947).
245. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110-15 (1978)
(announcing that ad hoc inquiry is best measure of due process challenge).
246. At least one commentator refutes this assertion. See Anderson, Court-Appointed
Counsel: The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEo. J.L. ETHICS 503, 521-
23 (1990). Anderson analogizes the services attorneys render when appointed to the duties
imposed upon land developers to pay for intrastructure improvements needed for their
projects. Id. at 523. Anderson notes that this cost is then passed on to users of the developer's
service. Attorneys, however, unlike developers, cannot always pass on this cost. For that
matter, in many cases, only a portion of the organized bar, i.e. criminal defense counsel, will be
forced to pass on costs to clients. Anderson's analogy also fails in that the users of a devel-
oper's services do so voluntarily and with the ability to foresee government imposed costs.
Moreover, one might question the equation of consumers of legal services with consumers of a
developer's services.
247. See infra note 258 (cases detailing excessive burden on appointed attorneys).
248. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965).
249. Id. at 635-36.
250. Id. at 635.
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tral Transportation Co. v. New York City, 2 5 1 held that a good case for
asserting a taking arises when the state conducts "acquisitions of resources
to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions. '252 Court appointments fa-
cilitate a public function because appointment allows the state to fulfill the
duty imposed upon it by Gideon253 and subsequent cases. 254
The other element in the Penn Central analysis also is present. Attorneys
cannot perform two jobs at once. When appointed to represent an indigent
client, the time spent on that case cannot be charged to a paying client. The
appointed counsel thus loses remunerative time because of the appointment,
just as expert witnesses lose some of the value of their education when called
upon to testify.255
When compared to eminent domain law, court appointment clearly ap-
pears to constitute a taking.256 The Court accepts as a taking of property
mere interferences with property interests when the imposition is direct.257
When an attorney receives an appointment, he is directly imposed upon be-
cause his property becomes the property of the state until the case or ap-
pointment terminates. When appointments sometimes last for intolerable
periods, 258 the appointed attorney suffers a direct burden which nullifies his
earning power.259
After a taking of property without the consent of the owner26° has been
established, courts conduct an ad hoc examination of several factors to de-
termine if due process has been abridged.261 The Supreme Court, however,
has not yet formulated a clear test for this determination. 262 The current
test examines the extent of physical invasion of the property, the amount of
harm inflicted upon the property, and the quantity of good that comes from
the challenged action or the amount of evil prevented. 263 Some commenta-
251. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
252. Id at 128 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
253. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
254. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
256. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-66 (1946) (holding that direct invasion
of respondent's domain occurs when government frequently flies planes over land).
257. Id. at 265-67.
258. See, e.g., White v. Board of County Comm'rs , 537 So. 2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 1989)
(attorney spends three and one-half months on case, jeopardizing his private practice); People
v. Devin, 123 Ill. App. 2d 60, 525 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1988) (lawyer spends 48 hours on one brief
alone); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 838 (1987) (noting that one
attorney had 11 indigent appointments in six months; noting that in one locale an average
attorney receives 16 to 24 appointments annually; noting another case where attorney spends
90% of his time on one appointment case for three months).
259. See State ex. reL Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 838 (1987).
260. See Kunhardt & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 537, 540 (1925) (claimant may not
assert involuntary taking when he previously bound himself contractually).
261. See Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); see also infra note 263
and accompanying text (factors in test are laid out).
262. See Comment, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of
Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 383 (1981).
263. See Pennsylvania Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-28. See also Anderson, supra note 10, at 529-
30 (arguing that challenges to legislatively created, as opposed to judicial, appointments and
compensation programs must be limited to constitutional grounds). The Penn Central para-
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tors assert, however, that this test should be the test employed in a due pro-
cess challenge to attorney appointment. 264  Although one noted
commentator asserted that the principle of fairness should dictate the out-
come,265 the Court relies heavily on its promulgated test to the exclusion of
equitable considerations. 2 "6
Moreover, any equitable consideration by a court conducting a due pro-
cess analysis may be detrimental to the petitioner's case. This result appears
especially true in the case of an appointed attorney. In Penn Central the
Court held that compensation, even when due after the requisite analysis,
may be denied if the complainant enjoys a reciprocal benefit from the tak-
ing. 267 In the case of an appointed attorney, a number of benefits may result.
The attorney may receive publicity, new clients, and, arguably, already has
received the benefits of an exclusive right to practice law.
Many of these benefits, however, if they ever existed, now may be illu-
sory. 268 As a practical matter, the public pays little attention to most crimi-
nal cases. The appointed attorney, therefore, most likely labors without the
recognition that may lead later to remuneration. In addition, the practice of
law is both so expensive and competitive that the average attorney may not
receive any considerable benefit from his status.269 In addition, the develop-
ment of alternative dispute resolution techniques, small claims courts, and
"do it yourself" manuals for laypersons substantially lessen the demand for
attorneys. 270 Despite these changes, some persons still consider attorneys
the beneficiaries of a monopoly over the practice of law that offsets the bur-
den of court appointment. 271
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead27 2 the Supreme Court held that, ab-
sent a harsh impact on the petitioner, no compensation will be awarded. 273
Some courts use a harsh impact analysis similar to Goldblatt when address-
ing takings challenges to court appointment. 274 At least one federal court,
however, while appearing to ignore Goldblatt, applied a cursory takings
digm clearly rejects such a narrow inquiry proferred by Anderson. In addition, social science
policy arguments have been favorably received by the Court when making equal protection
and due process decisions. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
264. See Comment, supra note 262, at 387-88.
265. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1190-93 (1967).
266. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
267. Pennsylvania Cent, 438 U.S. at 131-35.
268. See Shapiro, supra note 5; State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 765 (Mo.
1985) (refuting alleged benefits enjoyed by appointed lawyers).
269. See Shapiro, supra note 5 (noting that lawyers do not enjoy many benefits from their
protected status); see also supra notes 106-148 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
271. See Comment, supra note 262, at 388-89. See also M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERN-
MENT 270 (1973) ("Justice Brandeis came to regard lawyers as a kind of public utility").
272. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
273. Id at 596.
274. See People ex rel. Conn. v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340 (1966)
(holding courts may award fees in excess of statutory allotment only when harsh impact on
attorney proven); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 836 (1987)
(holding system unconstitutional in unusual situations); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev. 582, 555
P.2d 490, 492-93 (1976) (following Conn).
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analysis and awarded an attorney compensation for expenses in the absence
of a truly harsh impact.275
Courts which implicitly follow Goldblatt find compensation systems to
violate the fifth amendment in certain instances. In State ex reL Partain v.
Oakley276 the West Virginia Supreme Court held the state's system for ap-
pointment approached unconstitutionality because it prevented the remuner-
ative practice of law.277 In addition, other state supreme courts hold
unconstitutional any limits on compensation when those limits are applied in
exceptional circumstances or when the loss imposed upon the appointed at-
torney is too great.278 Moreover, another line of decisions simply declares
uncompensated appointments patent violations of the fifth amendment. 279
In sum, a trend exists in today's courts toward relieving the attorney of
the historic obligation to accept uncompensated court appointments. 280
This trend, however, often overlooks the prescribed analysis announced by
the Supreme Court in Penn Central.28' The Penn Central paradigm requires
the satisfaction of all of its elements in the typical court appointment. An
attorney's property would be imposed upon and in some cases temporarily
eradicated by an appointment. 28 2 The same deprivation, however, would
serve a public end and create much needed services. Although this depriva-
tion could reach substantial proportions, the extent of good flowing from the
deprivation apparently satisfies the Penn Central requirements. Only in the
most extreme cases, therefore, should courts declare a counsel's appointment
a deprivation of property.
A remedy for the disparate results in the state courts is warranted by the
sheer variety of decisions. Adherance to the Penn Central holding provides
both uniformity and predictability for courts and attorneys. The number of
275. See Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that com-
pelling appointed attorney to advance out of pocket costs violates fifth amendment).
276. 159 W. Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976).
277. 227 S.E.2d at 319 (West Virginia Supreme Court declared that if appointments inter-
fere with the ability to"... engage in remunerative practice of law or substantially reduce an
attorney's income the requirements must be considered confiscatory and unconstitutional
[under the fifth and fourteenth amendments]").
278. See, e.g., White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989)(enlarging trial court's fee award in exceptional case); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d
1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986) (same); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337,
340-41 (1966) (holding courts possess inherent power to award few exceeding statutory maxi-
mum in exceptional cases); State ex tel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 842(1987) (holding statutory system of compensation unconstitutional as applied to exceptional
cases of hardship); Daires v. Markoff, 92 Nev. 582, 555 P.2d 490, 493 (1976) (following rule
announced in Conn); Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Okla. 1977) (following Conn).
279. See Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315
N.W.2d 9, 16 (Iowa 1982); Bedford v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 12, 14-15, 447 P.2d 193,
194-95 (1968) (all using fifth amendment to invalidate uncompensated appointments).
280. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 841 (1987) (re-
marking that "[t]he later cases reflect a definite trend toward recognizing that the historical
conditions from which the duty to provide free legal services evolved no longer exists in mod-
em America").
281. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
282. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-22 (1987) (accepting temporary takings as compensable under Penn Central analysis).
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challenges, moreover, would decrease as a coherent body of law developed
following an established standard. The beneficial effects would be manifold.
Fewer challenges would be considered or even commenced by disgruntled
attorneys, resulting in a lessening of the litigation burden. The best solution,
of course, arises from awarding standard rates, without limits, for compensa-
tion.28 3 The Supreme Court, however, must resolve the issue. The current
disparity in lower court holdings results in part from the Court's refusal to
assert a position on constitutional challenges to court appointment. 2 4 So
long as the Court refrains from deciding this important constitutional issue,
attorneys must continue to suffer deprivations of property and, therefore,
must continue to challenge the system.
C. Equal Protection
Equal protection challenges to court appointment allege that certain indi-
vidual lawyers and lawyers as a class are deprived of equal protection under
the laws28 5 as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 28 6 This argument
has arisen relatively recently, at least when applied to attorneys appointed
without provision for compensation.28 7 Only very recently, moreover, has a
state supreme court fully acknowledged and accepted this argument. 288
In State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith 289 the Kansas Supreme Court became the
first high court to hold that certain lawyers are denied equal protection when
283. The only permissible variance in compensation should adhere to the current federal
standards for compensation. The federal structure implicitly acknowledges higher practice
costs in regions by vesting limited authority to raise rates in the Judicial Conferences.
284. E.g., Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 109 S. Ct. 1814, 1821 n.6, 104 L. Ed. 2d 318,
329 n.6 (1989) (choosing not to address constitutional problems surrounding court appoint-
ment, despite relieving appointed attorney of obligation to serve).
285. A corollary equal protection issue concerns the rights of the indigent. In State ex rel
Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816, 843 (1987), the respondents contended that
equal protection was denied both to the appointed counsel and to the indigent the counsel was
appointed to serve.
286. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part "No state shall.., deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." But cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-24 (1980) which states:
A layman whose financial ability is not sufficient to permit payment of any fee
cannot obtain legal services, other than in cases where a contingent fee is appro-
priate, unless the services are provided for him. Even a person of moderate
means may be unable to pay a reasonable fee which is large because of the com-
plexity, novelty, or difficulty of the problem or similar factors.
287. See Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854,
867 (1986) (upholding equal protection challenge); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev. 582, 587, 555
P.2d 490, 492-93 (1976) (rejecting equal protection challenge because bar has standing ethical
obligation to render gratuitous assistance); see also Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 9 at 92;
Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & CoM. 3, 10 (1969); Com-
ment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgres-
sion, 60 Ky. L.J. 710, 721 (1972) (decisions in Cunningham and Smith might be interpreted as
overdue response to pleas by the commentators noted above that appointed counsel systems
deny lawyers equal protection under laws). But see Webb v. Baird, supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text (invalidation of court appointment system without provisions for compensation may
be construed as early acceptance of equal protection argument).




appointed to represent an indigent.29° Smith involved two Kansas district
court judges who chose to ignore the standing statutory provisions for pay-
ment of counsel. The judges, perceiving an undue burden on members of the
local bar, authorized payments far in excess of the existing statutory maxi-
mum.29 1 The State of Kansas filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
rogue judges to adhere to the statutory provisions, and the Kansas Supreme
Court agreed to hear the novel case.
The judges contended that the system violated the Equal Protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment 292 because attorneys were treated differently
than other professionals, and certain attorneys were treated differently be-
cause of their geographic location. 293 The court identified all Kansas attor-
neys and certain subsections of the bar as the class subject to invidious
discrimination. 294 Such identification of a discriminated class is the prelimi-
nary step in any equal protection analysis.295
To analyze the equal protection claim, the court initially applied the rea-
sonable basis test,296 which invalidates a state action only if the means em-
ployed are "wholly irrelevent to the achievement of the State's objective. '297
The court, however, ultimately reached its decison by employing a different
Supreme Court test,298 which asks whether the state action bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate government purpose. 299 The chosen test repre-
sents a more lenient standard for application of the equal protection guaran-
tee against invidious discrimination between persons and groups.3 °°
The Smith court dealt with issues reached only by one other court. 30
These two courts basically adapted due process arguments30 2 to the equal
protection question. In Smith the court examined cases in other jurisdic-
tions which held that the bar must not be forced to shoulder the entire bur-
290. Id. at 846.
291. Id. at 822.
292. See supra note 286.
293. Smith, 747 P.2d at 843.
294. Id. at 843-46.
295. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McCowan v.
Maryland, 306 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d
487, 498, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 403 U.S. 915 (1971), cert
denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971). This test is understandably less stringent than the one used when
examining a law which employs a suspect classification, such as race or wealth. See McLaugh-
lin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (race); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58
(1963) (wealth).
296. Smith, 747 P.2d at 843.
297. Id.
298. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
754-57 (1986).
299. Id.
300. -See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (source of the test); see generally
Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949) (exam-
ining Court's varying formulations of equal protection test).
301. See Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854,
867 (1986).
302. See, State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan 336, 747 P.2d 816, 845 (1987 (lawyers
denied equal protection because treated differently; same argument applied as due process
challenge in Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1974)); see also supra note
219 and accompanying text (noting overlap of claims).
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den of appointment. 30 3 The court then applied this rationale to the equal
protection issue.3°4 After looking both at the ethical obligation owed by
lawyers to serve the poor and their rights to equal protection, the court held
that lawyers as a class and lawyers in rural areas were subjected to invidious
discrimination. 305
These courts departed from established case law by recognizing that sys-
tems for the protection of the indigent's rights impose an unfair burden on
the class appointed to represent them.3° 6 What serves as a legitimate state
purpose, protecting the indigent's rights, actually engenders a parallel viola-
tion of the appointed attorney's rights.307 The absence of comparable re-
quirements for other professionals and existing systems for full
compensation of those professionals provides strong support for this
conclusion.30
Despite the degree of overlap between the equal protection and due pro-
cess questions, the two inquiries are distinct. In an equal protection exami-
nation, the welfare of the individual in the class imposed upon produces the
primary concern.3° 9 In contrast, due process considerations distinctly re-
volve around the individual's rights.310 The difference in examination of
these challenges, though, does not preclude application of the same solution
for both.
In both instances, the valid challenge rests upon unusual and extreme
facts. Compensating an attorney's expenses eliminates the undeniable bur-
den on an attorney's personal property.3 1' Each state, therefore, should
adopt such a provison without limitation. Payment for the attorney's serv-
ices, predicated on a firm, unvariable standard without regard to location or
ability, eliminates the causes of action presently asserted and treats all attor-
neys equally. Although some lawyers still would be forced to take additional
cases because of the absence of legal services agencies in their locale, every
lawyer nationwide would receive just and equal compensation for the serv-
ices rendered.
303. Smith, 747 P.2d at 844-45 (citations omitted).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 844.
306. See Gilbert & Gorenfeld, supra note 9, at 85-86.
307. Id. at 86.
308. Smith, 747 P.2d at 844-45 (noting that "veterinarians are statutorily entitled to rea-
sonable compensation for services which those professionals provide for the benefit of the
state" (emphasis in original)).
309. See Regents of the University v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (equal protection
right is a personal right but the infringement of that right results from a group classification).
310. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 233, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (inquiry is
directed towards the affected individual right).
311. See Smith, 747 P.2d at 842 (requiring attorneys to cover costs of litigation without
reimbursement deprives them of due process property right); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d
294, 298 (Ky. 1972) (requiring attorneys to take appointments without compensation deprives
them of property); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W.Va. 805, 813-14, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319
(1976) (when costs of appointment "substantially reduce the attorney's net income" attorney's
property right is abridged).
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D. Proposal: A Uniform Standard of Compensation
Currently, lawyers dread the possibility of court appointment. The intol-
erable burden placed upon many in the profession can hardly be called pub-
lic service. Lawyers with little or no interest in criminal representation are
forced to accept appointments for little or no pay. Consequently, lawyers
accept the financial and professional imposition reluctantly and, in some
cases, under the duress of potential court sanctions.312 To make matters
worse, only lawyers can be and are burdened with the problem of indigent
defendants. Appointments, however, threaten the lawyer's practice, clients,
financial worth, and, unfortunately, the quality of legal services.313 Such
factors define the dimensions of the constitutional problems with unpaid
court appointment.
Uniformity provides the answer to the constitutional challenges and to the
concomitant problems attending uncompensated court appointments. Strict
adherance to pronounced standards, either legislative or judicial, allows a
degree of predictability unseen in the past. Fewer challenges will merit con-
sideration by the courts and more time will thus be created for other press-
ing legal issues. Most importantly, however, adoption of a uniform standard
eliminates an incongruous anomaly in the judicial treatment of professionals.
The uniformity suggested here revolves around a universal standard for
compensation. 314 The first step is compensation of all appointed counsel for
expenses incurred while in the employ of an indigent client. This single
change largely eliminates the due process challenges now mounted by rural
lawyers.3 15 Second, a set hourly fee for services rendered, without an artifi-
cial ceiling, eradicates the other bases for constitutional challenge. The en-
tire class of appointed counsel would be accorded the same status and
312. See State v. Gasen, 48 Ohio App. 2d 191, 356 N.E.2d 505, 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976)
(attorney found in contempt for refusing to accept court appointment); Ex parte Gray, 649
S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (attorney found in contempt for declining to accept
appointment).
313. As yet another ground for attacking court appointments, lawyers have asserted inade-
quate payment raises the possibility of inadequate representation for the indigent client. See,
for example, Smith, 747 P.2d at 846, where the party challenging the state's payment provi-
sions alleged an indigent client's representation was jeopardized because appointed counsel do
not provide effective assistance. One commentator has alleged unpaid appointed attorneys do
not provide effective assistance to their underprivileged clients. See Comment, The Uncompen-
sated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710,
721 (1972); see also supra note 87 (text of sixth amendment).
314. The most enlightened effort yet made to uniformly compensate appointed counsel is in
the Criminal Justice Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(l)(1988). The act allows for variations in
rates according to the average cost of legal services in the area. See supra notes 159-160 and
accompanying text (describing system of compensation); see also Comment, A Statutory Propo-
sal Compensating Attorneys Appointed To Represent Indigent Civil Defendents, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 195, 218-23 (1988) (submitting proposed bill with uniformity as a critical
ingredient).
315. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 104 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1989) (rural lawyer challenges ap-
pointment); Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kansas 1988) (same). Rural lawyers suffer more when ap-
pointed because of uncompensated travel time, expenses, and overhead. Smith, 747 P.2d at
845-6. Rural lawyers may also lack the potential reserves and financial backing many firms
make available to their lawyers.
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compensation. Although lawyers in certain regions316 still would suffer the
imposition of more frequent appointment, the impact upon them would be
tolerable with adequate compensation. Such a program notably parallels the
new Medicare guidelines for payment of doctors which compensates doctors
for services rendered at pre-determined, standardized rates.317
V. CONCLUSION
As the practice of law changes, very few courts are adapting to meet the
new challenges engendered by these changes in the profession. The Supreme
Court is no exception. Its recent holding in Mallard3l8 indicates that the
Court remains content with the existing system for court appointment. The
Court's decision fails to recognize, however, that lawyers are no longer of-
ficers of the court or a special breed. Increasingly, though, state courts rec-
ognize this fact.3 19 As more and more courts follow suit, fewer barriers to
fair compensation for appointed counsel will remain.
While thirteenth amendment challenges carry little weight, 320 challenges
based upon the fifth and fourteenth amendments merit continued and widen-
ing recognition by the Supreme Court as the appropriate forum for determi-
nation of these constitutional questions. 32 1 At this stage, however, reluctant
courts and state legislatures, guided by inertia, prevent realization of this
proposal. Absent action by the Court, the future holds opportunity for state
courts and legislatures to relieve the ever-increasing burden placed upon a
profession that no longer enjoys the privileges of a noblesse oblige
existence.322
Obviously, the expense of a uniform standard of compensation must be
316. See Smith, 747 P.2d at 845 (attorneys in rural areas inherently suffer more appoint-
ments in part because of absence of public defender).
317. The only difference between compensation for appointed counsel and for Medicare
doctors is that Medicare compensates doctors on the basis of the service rendered rather than
by the time expended. Medicare's alluring approach of fixed reimbursement on the basis of the
service performed might appeal to increasingly cost conscious legislators. This system, how-
ever, as noted by many doctors, fails to take into account numerous procedures which occa-
sionally complicate or lengthen the compensated service. Legal services, moreover, rarely are
performed in exactly the same way each time. This uniqueness of service results in fixed com-
pensation for drafting a response, for example, inherently over or undercompensating certain
attorneys. The obvious solution, then, is to adopt fixed hourly rates for services rendered, with
certain discretion similar to remittitur entrusted to the trial judge.
318. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 n.6, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 329 n.6. See also Barnard v. Thorn-
stenn, 109 S. Ct. 1294, 1299, 103 L. Ed. 2d 559, 564 (1989) (implying bar could compel law-
yers to take indigent's case); Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285
(1985) (implying attorneys might be required to counsel destitute).
319. See supra notes 97-98, 219-22 and accompanying text (cases acknowledging attorneys
are no longer a special breed).
320. See supra notes 177-218 and accompanying text (analysis of thirteen amendment chal-
lenges to court appointment).
321. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), where Chief Justice Marshall
opined that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is ... [t]his is of the very essence of judicial duty." Id. at 177-78.
322. See Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1960), overruled in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967). Justice Harlan notes that "[w]e do not hold that lawyers, because of their special
status in society, can therefore be deprived of constitutional rights assured to others." Cohen,
366 U.S. at 129-30.
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considered. The cost of such a change, however, may bring more benefits
than initially envisioned. Although such a standard provides no guarantee
of effective legal assistance, as a practical matter, assured payment would
bolster the morale of many practicing attorneys. Consequently, the financial
and professional stigma of court appointment would likely diminish. Most
importantly, the constitutional grounds now asserted by attorneys challeng-
ing the system would disappear.
Such advantages may fall upon deaf ears in America's legislatures. Legis-
lators would be ill-advised, however, to ignore the merits of the propostion.
Constituents are tired of deferred adjudication, plea bargaining, and other
examples of our congested court system. In addition, elimination of this
needless source of litigation surely would ease the strain on courts' dockets.
Court appointments which face constitutional difficulty are a creature of
an overworked criminal justice system and inadequate funding. Although
this Comment makes no attempt to address the plague of crime, compensa-
tion of appointed counsel aids society in its prosecution of crime and, there-
fore, helps to guarantee the rights of all those involved in the criminal justice
system. The unusual privileges accorded attorneys, however, should not
override their entitlement to equal protection and due process of law. Other
professions neither shoulder nor face the uncompensated service expected of
attorneys.
Furthermore, the mere existence of budgetary cOnstraints should not lead
to the exaction of a pound of flesh from attorneys. The same arguments
failed to persuade the Supreme Court when deciding the extent of rights for
indigent criminal defendants. 323 Similarly, these arguments should not pre-
vail in the case of potentially impoverished attorneys. 324 The constitutional
protections and other advantages far outweigh the costs of reasonable com-
pensation for all appointed counsel.
323. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). To the contrary, the vast
sums spent by criminal defendants on the best available counsel indicated to the Court that
financial constraints should not be a factor in extending the right to counsel to all criminal
defendants.
324. For that matter, legislators would be ill-advised to ignore Professor Maguire's pre-
scient comment that "[a]ny plan of doing justice to the poor by doing injustice to the bar will
soon collapse." Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. REV. 361, 392 (1923). The
collapse Maguire foresaw appears to be culminating now. See Anderson, Court Appointed
Counsel, The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Conscription, 3 GEO. J.L. ETHIcS 503, 509
(1990) (noting "recent flurry of reversals" striking down appointments as unconstitutional).
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